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Comprehensive Land Use Planning: 
Learning How and Where to Grow , 
John R. Nolon* 
"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from 
here?" asked Alice. "That depends a good deal on where you 
want to get to," said the cat.' 
I. Introduction 
A. An Aging Citadel Under Siege 
Land use in this country is determined by zoning ordi- 
nances adopted by local governments. Their provisions dictate 
the types of uses to which land may be put, the density at which 
development may happen, the height, size and shape of build- 
ings, and the mix of commercial, residential, public and other ' 
land uses in each locality. Zoning is a key method by which soci- 
ety encourages the development of jobs and housing, protects 
natural resources and the environment, and defines the charac- 
ter of its communities. 
The law of most states stipulates that zoning is valid only if 
it is in accordance with a comprehensive land use plan.2 Plan- 
ning "is the essence of zoning" says the judiciary in New York 
State.s comprehensive planning is society's insurance that the 
public welfare is served by land use regulation.' 
As the predicate for zoning, comprehensive planning is a 
critical public function. What constitutes comprehensive plan- 
* B.A. University of Nebraska 1963; J.D. University of Michigan 1966. Mr. Nolon is 
Professor of Law at  Pace University School of Law where he directs the Land Use Law 
Center and teaches and writes in the areas of land use, property, environmental regula- 
tion, and real estate transactions and finance. 
1. LEWIS CARROL. ALICE'S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 64 (Penguin Books 1960) 
(1865). 
2. 1 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER.' JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OP ZONING A N D .  PLANNING, 
3 12.02 (1992); see infra note 112. 
3. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463,469, 235 N.E.2d 897,900-01,288 N.Y.S.2d 
888, 893 (1968). 
4. See, e.g., id., 235 N.E.2d at  900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  893-94. 
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ning and how planning is done are determined by state legisla- 
t u r e ~ . ~  Given the importance of land use and the central legal 
role of comprehensive planning, one would expect state statutes 
to carefully define a comprehensive land use plan and to provide 
a predictable, reliable and effective method of land use planning. 
Surprisingly, this is not the case in the majority of states, in- 
cluding New Y ~ r k . ~  
New York's statutes are typical of those of nearly half of the 
states in this ~ o u n t r y . ~  They do not define properly what a land 
use plan is. There is no requirement that the plans be kept up- 
to-date. They do not require that municipalities adopt such 
plans before they enact zoning ordinances. Where a land use 
plan and a zoning ordinance are adopted by a community, the 
statutes do not specify how they are to be interrelated. 
The benefit of this legal dissonance is flexibility. Since plans 
can be whatever localities want them to be, zoning is equally 
malleable, since its purpose is to accomplish the objectives of the 
comprehensive plan. In this, danger lurks. Recent New York 
cases, analyzed in this article, make it clear that land use regula- 
tions will not be sustained if they are ad hoc, arbitrary, capri- 
cious, unjust, unfair or irrational - characteristics they risk as- 
suming if not demonstrably in conformance with a discrete and 
well considered plan. 
The biggest danger in this enigmatic system is its lack of a 
regional perspective. Although the courts urge that local zoning 
ordinances consider regional  need^,^ there is no such require- 
ment in the statutes. Regional development patterns are shaped 
by the uncoordinated land use decisions of local governments. 
Our legal system vests these insulare institutions with primary 
authority to determine when and where development will occur. 
The landscape affected by these uncoordinated decisions is 
closely interrelated by the movement of air and water and of the 
traffic of people as they commute to and from home, work, shop- 
ping and recreation. Yet in most states, including New York, 
5. 1 ZIECLER, supra note 2, $5  1.02[1]-[2], at 1-25 to 1-29. 
6. 1 id. $ 12.04. 
7. 1 id. $ 12.04 n.3. 
8. See infra notes 57-62, 330 and text accompanying. 
9. See infra note 61 and text accompanying. 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace L. Rev. 352 1993-1994 
19931 LAND USE SYMPOSIUM 353 
there is no mechanism for interrelating the land use plans and 
zoning ordinances of adjacent muni~ipalities.'~ Increasingly, 
state and federal statutes attempt to protect threatened estua- 
ries, aquifers, air quality, wetlands, and transportation systems 
by dealing with the effects of the land use patterns without har- 
monizing the direction or substance of local land use plans 
themselves. 
In New York, the legal underpinnings of the current land 
use system were set nearly eighty years ago." They were 
designed in a different era to meet different challenges. In those 
days, "comprehensive planning" referred to "city-wide" plan- 
ning because developing communities were separated by open 
spaces and land development impacts were local in character. At 
that time, conformance with a comprehensive plan was defined 
very loosely. Localities were not required to adopt discrete land 
use plans. I t  was enough that zoning ordinances contained some 
evidence of comprehensive planning.12 
In today's more complex and interrelated regions, "compre- 
hensive" planning, in effect, means "regional" planning. Deci- 
sions made in one municipality affect regional air quality, the 
water quality of others in a watershed, and the cost and availa- 
bility of housing and commercial real estate in the market area. 
Without laws that require the adoption of discrete land use 
plans, that tie zoning ordinances directly to the accomplishment 
of the provisions of those plans, and that require some relation- 
ship among local plans in the larger region, we are doomed, like 
Alice, to have no way of knowing where we are going and, worse, 
no method of getting there should we somehow decide how and 
where we want to use and conserve the land. How we got so lost 
on our road to comprehensive land use planning and how to find 
the road to a mutually satisfactory destination are the keenest 
questions facing land use regulators today. 
B. Purpose of Article 
This article explores the origins, evolution and contempo- 
rary workings of the legal system that determines the use of 
10. See infra note 68 and text accompanying. 
11. 1 ZIEGLER, supra note 2, 5 12.07, at 12-45 to 12-50. 
12. See infra notes 32-33 and text accompanying. 
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land. In Part 11, the development of zoning and comprehensive 
planning laws in the United States is traced, emphasizing the 
importance that zoning be "in conformance with" a comprehen- 
sive land use plan, a requirement meant to provide direction and 
purpose to land use regulation. This retrospect shows that, from 
the beginning, the framers of the nation's land use regime were 
indecisive. They failed to define a comprehensive plan, to detail 
what such a plan should contain, and to prescribe how planning 
should serve as the predicate for zoning. Decisions of New 
York's highest court that criticize the state legislature's failure 
to redress the enigmatic nature of the eighty year-old system are 
discussed, so that contemporary challenges may be addressed. 
Part I11 analyzes several New York cases that invalidate 
zoning regulations because of their failure to conform to a com- 
prehensive plan. A checklist of the charges that property owners 
can bring successfully against land use regulations emerges from 
this discussion and highlights the special vulnerability of regula- 
tions that do not meet the historic "in conformance with" 
requirement. 
Part IV explores the notion that regulations can constitute 
"takings" in violation of the Fifth Amendment's guarantees and 
then describes how conformance with comprehensive planning 
insulates regulations from Fifth Amendment challenges, as well 
as from the historic checklist of charges discussed in Part 111. 
The failure of the statutory law to make comprehensive plan- 
ning mandatory, and to tie regulations closely to it, is rectified, 
to a degree, by the weight of the case law explored in this part. 
The decisional law creates a practical necessity that local gov- 
ernments adopt comprehensive land use plans, a partial accom- 
modation of the statutory law's failure to do so. The argument is 
advanced that this judicial imperative to plan before restricting 
land use applies to all land use regulations, not just zoning. 
Part V discusses two emerging land use issues. The first in- 
volves the judicial requirement that local zoning, labeled "insu- 
lar" by New York's highest court,13 must consider regional 
needs. The second is how the rapidly increasing number of fed- 
eral and state laws that affect land use are to be coordinated 
with local land use regulations and conformed to the compre- 
13. See infra note 61 and text accompanying. 
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hensive plans that local regulations are to advance. How, for ex- 
ample, in the absence of any formal division of the state into 
planning regions, and without benefit of plans for those regions, 
can local plans consider regional needs? Without cogent regional 
plans, how can the plethora of local, state, and federal land use 
regulations be harmonized? By concluding with an analysis of 
the many constituent groups whose interests are compromised 
by the lack of a regional solution to the land use dilemma, the 
article ends with the unimaginative suggestion that New York 
can and should address these issues and, in that process, decide 
"where it wants to get to" regarding the use and preservation of 
its land. 
11. Background - The Enigma of Planning as the Legal 
Basis for Zoning 
A. History of Local Control of Land Development 
A vigorous debate1' over the wisdom of conforming market 
forces to a public plan for orderly development took place dur- 
ing the early part of this century.16 It  culminated decisively in 
1926 in favor of comprehensi~e~~ control of development in the 
United States Supreme Court decision, Village of Euclid u. Am- 
14. Zoning was "seen either as a protection of the suburban American home against 
the encroachment of urban blight and danger, or as the unrestrained caprice of village 
councils claiming unlimited control over private property in derogation of the Constitu- 
tion." Arthur V. N. Brooks, The Office File Box - Emanations from the Battlefield, in 
ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM 3,7 (Charles M. Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989). 
15. The acceptance of comprehensive zoning spread quickly as landowners began to 
realize that reasonable restrictions, public control of the landowner's and neighboring 
property for the public good, would tend to stabilize and preserve the value of all prop- 
erty. 1 HAROLD M. LEWIS. PLANNING THE MODERN CITY 255 (1949). New York City's 
adoption of comprehensive zoning in 1916 did in fact result in stabilized property values. 
Id. at  261 (noting a statement made by Edward M. Bassett, a leader in New York's 
adoption of comprehensive zoning). For example, prior to the adoption of comprehensive 
zoning in New York City, the introduction of garment manufacturers into what had been 
a shopping district along the lower portion of Fifth Avenue caused property values in the 
district to drop by more than 50%, with a corresponding loss in tax revenues. 1 JAMES 
METZENBAUM. THE LAW OF ZONING 66-67 (2d ed. 1955). 
16. Before the era of comprehensive zoning, a few cities utilized area, use, and 
height restrictions separately. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at  258. I t  was not until New York 
City determined that those protective restrictions and others should be collected in one 
general ordinance, in order to protect land values and maintain the public health and 
safety for the public good, that America's first comprehensive zoning regulation was 
adopted. 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at  7. 
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bler Realty Co.17 Justice Sutherland's opinioq reflected a gather- 
ing consensus among state supreme court judges that public 
guidance of private development was within the police power of 
the states. 
Euclid quoted two of these state court decisions to support 
a pair of previously controversial notions. First, the "growing 
complexity of our civilization make[s] it necessary for the State 
. . . to limit individual activities to a greater extent."18 Second, 
"[the court has] nothing to do with the question of the wisdom 
. . . of municipal ordinances. If they are not satisfying to a ma- 
jority of the citizens, their recourse is to the ballot - not the 
The evolution of public control of land development started 
centuries before the beginning of the Christian era.20 As an ex- 
ample, a Roman commission in 451-450 B.C. adopted building 
regulations that resemble the set-back requirements found in to- 
day's zoning  ordinance^.^^ In 1581, certain noxious property uses 
were banned "within the compass and precinct of two and 
twenty miles from the City of L ~ n d o n . " ~ ~  Similar laws were 
passed by the early American colonies. For example, in 1692, 
certain business uses, deemed "offensive" by the Province of 
Massachusetts Bay, were limited to certain locations. Violations 
were punishable by fines, a portion' of which was given to the 
informer.23 Prior to the enactment of comprehensive zoning or- 
dinances, some municipalities separately enacted use, area, and 
height restrictions on building de~elopment.~' 
B. Codification of the Local Land Use Control System 
During the first twenty-five years of the twentieth century, 
local officials came to realize that narrowly focused, nuisance 
17. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
18. Id. at 392 (quoting City of Aurora v. Burns, 149 N.E. 784, 788 (Ill. 1925)). 
19. Id. at 393 (quoting State v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 444 (La. 1923)). 
20. For examples of this evolution, including those referenced here, see ROBERT R. 
WRIGHT & MORTON GITELMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAND USE 1-14 (3d ed. 1982) 
and chapter 4 of 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15. 
21. WRIGHT & GITELMAN, supra note 20, at 2. 
22. Id. at 5-6. 
23. Id. at 9. 
24. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at 258. 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace L. Rev. 356 1993-1994 
19931 LAND USE SYMPOSIUM 357 
preventing legislation was not sufficient to address the needs of 
the nation's increasingly complex urban areas.26 The first com- 
prehensive zoning ordinance in the United States was passed in 
1916 by New York City.26 Other cities soon followed the New 
York example.27 
In 1922, the U.S. Department of Commerce published a 
model statute, the Standard State Zoning Enabling to 
promote zoning.2e The model act, with certain variations, was 
adopted by most states as a method of encouraging and guiding 
their municipalities in adopting zoning  ordinance^.^^ So great 
was the perceived need for the regulation of land development, 
that by the time the Euclid case was decided in 1926, forty-three 
states had passed enabling statutes and five hundred municipali- 
ties had adopted local zoning  ordinance^.^^ In this way, public 
control of market forces in land development was codified. 
Zoning, according to one view, was intended to be an end in 
itself.32 However, the drafters of the enabling acts thought that 
25. 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at  14-15; see also Euclid, 272 U.S. a t  386-87. 
26. New York's comprehensive zoning efforts began in 1910 and culminated on July 
25, 1916, through the adoption of the New York City Zoning Resolution. 1 LEWIS, supra 
note 15, at 259; 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at  7. 
27. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at  262. 
28. STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1926) re- 
printed in 5 EDWARD H. ZIEGLER, JR., RATHKOPF'S THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 
app. A. (1988). 
29. Herbert Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce, appointed Frederick L. Olmsted, 
Edward M. Bassett and Alfred Bettman to his nine-man advisory committee to the De- 
partment of Commerce. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 328 (Richard P. Fishman ed., 
1978). This advisory committee on City Planning and Zoning promulgated the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) in 1922 and the Standard City Planning Enabling 
Act (SPEA) in 1928. Id. Olmsted was a prominent landscape architect with an expansive 
vision of the comprehensive plan and its importance. Id. at  327. Bassett served as chair 
of the New York City Committee on Building Districts and Restrictions, whose work led 
to the  adoption of the first comprehensive zoning ordinance. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at  
259-60. Bettman was a prominent Ohio attorney who wrote an amicus curiae brief on 
behalf of the city in Euclid that is cited as the "primary source" of the Court's decision 
in Euclid. William M. Randle, Professors, Reformers, Bureaucrats, and Cronies: The 
Players in Euclid v. Ambler, in ZONING AND THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 14, at  31, 
32. 
30. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at  331. 
31. It  is no wonder "[tlhe zoning idea . . . spread with extraordinary rapidity, and it 
may safely be stated that there is no aspect of city planning which [has] now attract[ed] 
more attention." 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at  261. 
32. The "unitary" view of zoning holds that the zoning ordinance itself contains 
comprehensive planning principles and can exist independently from a comprehensive 
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more was needed.33 A second model act, the Standard City Plan- 
ning Enabling Act,34 promulgated in 1928, promoted the adop- 
tion of a local comprehensive land use plan as a document sepa- 
rate and distinct from zoning.36 This act; and its adoption by the 
states, gave rise in some quarters to the notion that comprehen- 
sive land use planning should precede the zoning ordinance and 
plan without violating the legal requirement that zoning be "in accordance with" a com- 
prehensive plan. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, a t  332 & n.26; see also id. 
a t  342-44. The historical reason that zoning came before planning in the United States is 
said to be the urgent need for its adoption to protect single-family districts, the local 
tax-base and property values. See Jerry Mitchell, In Accordance with a Comprehensive 
Plan: The Rise of Strict Scrutiny in Florida, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 79, 81 (1990) 
(citing Charles M. Haar, I n  Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 
1154 (1955) and Charles L. Simeon, The Paradox of "In Accordance with a Comprehen- 
sive Plan" and Post Hoc Rationalizations: The Need for Efficient and Effective Judicial 
Review of Land Use Regulations, 16 STETSON L. REV. 603 (1987)). 
In part, the urgency for promoting zoning before planning resulted from Herbert 
Hoover's effort to relieve housing shortages through "the adoption of zoning plans which 
would protect residential districts. . . . [Wlith such protection assured, real estate owners 
would be more likely to resume the building of houses." 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, a t  262. 
These opinions are reinforced by this language from the report of New York City's advi- 
sory committee on zoning, issued on December 23, 1913, prior to the adoption of the 
nation's first comprehensive zoning ordinance: 
It  may seem paradoxical to  hold that a policy of building restriction tends to a 
fuller utilization of land than a policy of no restriction; but such is undoubtedly 
the case. The reason lies in the greater safety and security to investment secured 
by definite restrictions. The restrictions tend to fix the character of the 
neighborhood. 
Id. at  260 (quoting HEIGHTS OF BUILDING COMMISSION, REPORT O THE COMMITTEE OF THE 
HEIGHT. SIZE AND ARRANGEMENT OF BUILDINGS OF THE BOARD OF ESTIMATE AND APPOR- 
TIONMENT OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK (1913)). There is evidence that early proponents of 
zoning were motivated as well by public health and safety matters, traffic congestion, 
and the like. 1 METZENBAUM, supra note 15, at  7-8; 1 NORMAN WILLIAMS, JR. & JOHN M. 
TAYLOR. AMERICAN PLANNING LAW 311 (1988). In fact, the United States Supreme Court 
sustained zoning based on its similarity to common law prohibitions on the nuisance use 
of private property. Euclid, 272 U.S. a t  388. 
33. Bettman took the position that the comprehensiveness of the zoning ordinance 
itself was the key consideration, although he recognized the importance of conforming to 
a plan: "[Tlhe fact that the zone plan is an organic part of the whole city plan furnishes 
an additional item of proof of its reasonableness." Alfred Bettman, The Present State of 
Court Decisions on Zoning, 2 CITV PLAN. 24, 26-27 (1926). "By zoning is meant the com- 
prehensive zone plan based on a comprehensive survey; and if the zone plan be part of a 
more comprehensive city plan, it derives from that fact an additional element of reasona- 
bleness and therefore has additional constitutional support." Id. at  34. 
34. STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING ACT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce 1928). 
35. THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING 40 (David S. Arnold et al. eds., 
1979). 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace L. Rev. 358 1993-1994 
19931 LAND USE SYMPOSIUM 359 
serve as its p r e d i ~ a t e . ~ ~  In the promulgation of the model acts 
and the progress of local land use regulation, zoning came first. 
Many states adopted the Standard City Planning Enabling Act, 
but after they had created the legal framework for z~ning.~'  
Most failed in any meaningful way to prescribe how zoning and 
planning were to be integrated. This fissure remains today, nar- 
rowed by provisions in most states that require zoning to be in 
accordance with the comprehensive land use plan and by re- 
forms in others that require a plan to be adopted before land use 
is r e g ~ l a t e d . ~ ~  Because zoning preceded planning in both the 
Hoover Commission and in most state legislatures, the enigma of 
36. Lewis wrote that: "The danger is that [zoning] may be considered a substitute 
for city planning and that, a zoning plan having been adopted, enthusiasm and interest 
may die out. Zoning is not a substitute for a city plan; it is an essential part of a compre- 
hensive plan." 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at 261-62. 
Professor Charles Haar viewed the statutory comprehensive plan . . . as a separate 
document for purposes of zoning 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan.' In 
light of the lack of specific authority in the [Standard State Zoning Enabling Act], 
Haar recognized that his position was in the minority. But today there is a demon- 
strable shift toward his point of view. . . . It is ironic that while Haar's writing was 
widely quoted, and relied upon in a number of land-use decisions, he was fre- 
quently cited to support the "unitary" view of the statutory requirement . . . (the 
zoning ordinance itself suffices as the comprehensive plan), a position he attacked 
in his own writing. 
HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at 331-32 (footnotes omitted) (citing 
Charles M. Haar, In Accordance With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 
1157 (1955). 
37. HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at  49 & n.238. 
38. See infra note 85 for those states that have mandated local governments to 
adopt comprehensive plans before regulating land use. The notes accompanying the 
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act state that the requirement that zoning be "in accor- 
dance" with a comprehensive plan "will prevent haphazard and piecemeal zoning. No 
zoning should be done without such a comprehensive study." HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER 
LAW, supra note 29, a t  328. Language in the Standard City Planning Enabling Act that 
defines the content and role of the comprehensive plan throws further light on the legal 
effect of the plan. The Standard City Planning Enabling Act defined the purpose of the 
master plan as: 
Guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development 
of the municipality and its environs which will, in accordance with present and 
future needs, best promote health, safety, order, morals, convenience, prosperity, 
and general welfare as well as efficiency and economy in the process of develop- 
ment, including, among other things, adequate provision for traffic, the provision 
of safety from fire and other dangers, adequate provisions for light and air, the 
promotion of good civic design, wise and efficient expenditure of public funds, and 
the adequate provision of public utilities and other public requirements. 
Id. a t  329 (quoting SPEA 8 7). 
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conforming zoning to planning is as old as comprehensive land 
use regulation itself. 
The Standard City Planning Enabling Act recommended 
that plans be adopted by planning boards while zoning ordi- 
nances were to be adopted by the local legislative bodies.gB This 
separation of responsibility for the preparation of zoning ordi- 
nances and land use plans renders the local land use system 
more enigmatic; in practice, how can a local legislative body be 
bound by a plan adopted by a lay board that is advisory in func- 
tion? This division of authority has a certain logic, however. A 
visionary, long-term plan for the community does not have 
short-term impacts on property values and neighborhood char- 
acter, and is less likely to arouse impassioned resistance.'O Since 
a planning board is comprised of appointed, rather than elected, 
members, the pressure of the electorate is felt less in its 
 deliberation^.^^ 
In these ways, long-term community planning is immunized 
from short-term political considerations. To the extent that the 
zoning ordinance, although adopted by the local legislature, an 
elected body, is required to conform to the comprehensive land 
use plan, it enjoys a degree of immunization from such pressures 
39. Bassett recognized the difficulty of keeping the comprehensive plan current and 
supported the notion that the planning board shall adopt the plan, not the municipal 
legislature. EDWARD M. BASSEW, THE MASTER PLAN 83-84 (1938). Compare N.Y. GEN. 
Crw LAW 3 28-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993), and N.Y. TOWN LAW 3 272-a (McKin- 
ney 1987 & Supp. 1993), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW 3 7-722 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993) 
(empowering planning boards to enact master plans) with N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(24) 
(McKinney 1989), and N.Y. TOWN LAW 3 261 (McKinney 1987), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW 
3 7-700 (McKinney 1973) (empowering town boards, village boards, and city councils, 
respectively, to enact zoning ordinances). 
40. "It is of the essence of zoning, therefore, that it regulates development. Planning 
does not involve this coercive control, although zoning ordinances are the means whereby 
planning goals are achieved." BEVERLY J. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN THE UNITED 
STATES 4-5 (1982); see, e.g., Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198 
(1936) (master plan does not effect a taking of property). 
41. The important thing is that the work of planning be entrusted to [those 
with] vision as well as technical training and experience. . . . [A] reasonable plan, 
once decided upon, should be adhered to in its essential features notwithstanding 
the opposition and the insistent demands for a departure from it which are likely 
to be encountered from those who are actuated by selfish interest or who are una- 
ble to look beyond their own limited horizon. 
1 LEWIS, supra note 15, a t  17. 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace L. Rev. 360 1993-1994 
LAND U S E  SYMPOSIUM 
C .  Defining a Land Use Plan 
As this land use system evolved, basic concepts were left un- 
defined, not the least of which was the definition of a compre- 
hensive land use plan itself.4s The definitions of a comprehen- 
sive land use plan used during the formative period of this 
century are as numerous as are the terms used to describe such a 
plan.44 The document itself is called, variously, a master plan, a 
42. There is a great need for the master plan even though it is visionary in nature, 
for 
[wlithout one, if an emergency arises which brings a popular clamor for some par- 
ticular bridge or tunnel or main thoroughfare, this clamor is likely to be translated 
into a favorable vote by the [legislative body]. Later the [legislative body] may 
discover that the new improvement which may have cost millions of dollars was 
not co-ordinated with other features of the plan. Every city engineer of experience 
realizes that there ought to be a master plan and also official maps. 
 BASSET^, supra note 39, at  69. Planning commissions are to give guidance to legislative 
bodies; the "master plan" serves as the guide and should be "a plastic plan kept within 
the confines of the commission." Id. at  67-68; see Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 
N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968). 
43. A leading contemporary textbook on planning published by the American Plan- 
ning Association defines a land use plan as having the following characteristics: 
It  is primarily a physical plan, although it may incorporate social and economic 
objectives. 
* I t  is long-range, slightly utopian, inspired by a vision of the future, and provides 
how to get there. 
* It is comprehensive, dealing with the entire community and its major develop- 
ment issues: transportation, housing, land use, utilities, recreation and their 
interrelationships. 
* The plan contains a statement of policy and is a guide to the land use actions of 
local legislators and other decision-makers. 
THE PRACTICE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT PLANNING, supra note 35. 
44. 1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at  7-8, quotes several early experts on the definition of a 
land use plan. George McAneny, who was Chairman of the Board of the Regional Plan- 
ning Association, defined city planning as: 
getting ready for the future . . . growth. I t  is the guidance into proper channels of 
a community's impulses towards a larger and broader life. On the face it has to do 
with things physical - the laying out of streets and parks and rapid-transit lines. 
But its real significance is far deeper; a proper city plan has a powerful influence 
for good upon the mental and moral development of the people. It  is the firm base 
for the building of a healthy and happy community. 
Id.  a t  7. Earle S. Draper defined city planning as: 
a great number of things. Careful surveys and inventories of resources are necessa- 
rily the first requirement. The deliberative process which we call planning consists 
of an analysis of the facts, of an appraisal of the situation, and of the resulting 
considered opinion which comes forth as a plan presented in the proper garb, 
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comprehensive plan, a comprehensive master plan, a land use 
plan, a comprehensive land use plan, an official master plan, and 
so on.46 There was no clear agreement as to whether this docu- 
ment should limit itself to physical phen~mena, '~ or should in- 
clude economic, demographic, and social matters.'? What is 
meant by comprehensive itself is ~nclear . '~  Most definitions pre- 
suppose a local focus, but some include regional and state-wide 
 consideration^.^^ The precise relationship of the comprehensive 
whether i t  be pictures, charts, maps, verbal descriptions, or a combination of all of 
these. 
Id. Nelson P. Lewis defined it as "simply the exercise of such foresight as will promote 
the orderly and sightly development of a city and its environs along rational lines with 
due regard for health, amenity, and convenience and for its commercial and industrial 
advancement." Id. 
45. 'Planning,' as it was conceived by i b  great early advocates, Bassett, Bettman, 
and others, involved a great deal more than the preparation of one all-controlling, 
definitive plan which was to be the blueprint for all public and private develop- 
ment. On the contrary, there were to be many plans, each evolved for a special 
purpose, some outlining proposed public development, others outlining sub-divi- 
sion control, and still others showing where it was proposed to curb private build- 
ing - the zoning map. Some plans thus drawn were to have the force of local law 
(such was the zoning map); others were merely to forecast future developments 
(e.g., population changes), and others were to be essentially advisory in their na- 
ture. The master plan, properly so called, was to be of the latter variety, incorpo- 
rating the planner's ideas as to the ideal development of the community. 
POOLEY, supra note 40, at  14-15. 
46. [A] different type [of definition] appears in the following statement by Ed- 
ward M. Bassett, an attorney eminent in planning and zoning law: 
City planning subjects are streets, parks, public reservations, sites for public 
buildings, harbor lines, locations for transportation facilities, and zoning regu- 
lations. There may be others, but I think not. When these are stamped by law 
on the land, there you have a city plan. 
1 LEWIS, supra note 15, at  7-8. 
47. The evolution of planning science is influenced in part by the following: (1) 
demographics; (2) economics; (3) views of government responsibility; (4) planning theo- 
ries; and (5) the ever emerging stressors in our developed and developing regions. HOUS- 
ING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at  325. 
48. The American public is not educated to the necessity of a comprehensive 
plan, but is sometimes alive to . . . one feature of such a plan, as, for instance, 
transportation or zoning; and the planner, unable to do what he would, must do 
what he can. In such cases, however, the need of a general plan should always be 
kept in mind, and as an incident to the smaller task, as much of the larger under- 
taken as is feasible. This is in fact the practice of wise city planners; for instance, 
all good zoning is based on preliminary surveys, which are partial planning 
studies. 
FRANK B. WILLIAMS. THE LAW OF CITY PLANNING AND ZONING 28 (1922). 
49. The expanding scope of city planning is indicated by the statement of pur- 
poses in the constitution of the American Institute of Planners [originally the 
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land use plan with the zoning ordinance, the zoning map, and 
the official map was never entirely agreed upon." The elements 
of a plan, that is, the subjects to be covered in it, have been 
described in numerous ways as we1ls6l 
This review of the creation and early evolution of the land 
use system establishes that it was enigmatic at inception. There 
was little agreement as to most of its critical details." One clear 
American City Planning Institute], as amended in 1946. It reads: 
Its particular sphere of activity shall be the planning of the unified development of 
urban communities and their environs, and of states, regions, and the nation, as 
expressed through determination of the comprehensive arrangement of land uses 
and land occupancy and the regulation thereof. 
1 LEWIS, supra note 15, a t  6, 8. 
50. "[Bassett] pointed out that 'a master plan cannot take the place of an official 
map, although it may help to co-ordinate items in that instrument.'" Id. at  54 (citing 
and quoting BASSEW, supra note 39, at  11-44,69). The SPEA itself caused confusion for 
localities that wanted to have their official map separate from their master plan. 
[Tlhe master plan is . . . called an official plan. I t  is contemplated that the official 
map and master plan shall not be two documents but one. Somewhat later the 
master plan is referred to repeatedly as the official master plan, the distinction 
being made between the master plan before it has been translated in whole or part 
into a precise plan through its adoption by the council and the same master plan 
after it has been made precise and so adopted. 
BASSETT, supra note 39, a t  85 (emphasis added). 
51. Lewis divided the comprehensive plan into six principal, non-exclusive elements 
that included: (1) "The pattern of land uses;" (2) the mass-transportation system; (3) 
public facilities for the fast movement of passengers and goods; (4) "the street system;" 
(5) the park and recreational system; and (6) "the location of public buildings." 1 LEWIS, 
supra note 15, at  54-55. In 1928, the SPEA set forth suggested elements of comprehen- 
sive plans. HOUSING ?OR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at  329. Edward M. Bassett 
listed zoning districts, streets, public building sites, public reservations, parks, public . 
utility routes, and bulkhead and pierhead lines as elements of planning. 1 LEWIS, supra 
note 15, at  54. One architect categorized the comprehensive plan into twelve areas of 
study: "streets; transportation of people; transportation of goods; factories and ware- 
houses; food supply and markets; water supply and sanitation; housing; recreation; parks; 
boulevards and tree planting; architecture; laws and financing." Id. a t  53. The city plan 
should contain and harmonize many elements including the streets, parks, and mass 
transportation. Additionally, it should address "the subdivision of building land and the 
regulation of the height, area with relation to the size of lot, and use of structures on it." 
WILLIAMS, supra note 48, at  27. 
52. Note how this lack of agreement persists. The Model Land Development Code 
makes planning optional, except when local governments want to enact certain sophisti- 
cated development controls. MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 3-101 nn.1-3 (1976). The Ameri- 
can Bar Association's Advisory Commission on Housing and Urban Growth recom- 
mended that local governments be mandated to undertake comprehensive planning. See 
HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW, supra note 29, at  408-10. It  was not until the 1992 legisla- 
tive session that the state legislature in Connecticut passed a statute requiring that local 
zoning regulations "consider" the local plan of development. 1992 CONN. LEGIS. SERV. 
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conclusion emerges, however. The framers of the system wanted 
those involved in its implementation to carry on a conversation 
about the goals and objectives of land use regulation. This con- 
versation was to touch on, at  a minimum, the major public inter- 
est issues affected by land use. I t  was to be carried on at  the 
appropriate level and in requisite detail to confront the chal- 
lenges of the day. This conversation, call i t  comprehensive land 
use planning, can be civil and productive because it is removed 
from the rancorous debate over specific regulations and particu- 
lar projects. Whether we are abiding by this vision of land use 
planning is the key question for lawmakers in New York to 
consider.63 
D. Challenges to Local Land Use Control in New York State 
In New York, there has been little effort to eliminate the 
confusion that surrounded the birth and early development of 
the national system of local land use contr01.~' This confusion is 
compounded by the complex challenges of a more interdepen- 
dent society threatened by environmental deterioration and eco- 
nomic stagnation. Despite clear evidence of our regional interde- 
pendence and the need for a more integrated and cost-effective 
system, local officials still determine the shape and pace of land 
development, decide the economic fate of land owners and act as 
the stewards of our natural resources. The system of local con- 
trol of land use has remained relatively unburdened by clear 
160-61 (West) (Public Act 92-50, amending CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-6 (West 1992)). 
53. See supra notes 8-10. 
54. In 1970, one of the first state-wide comprehensive planning bills in the country 
was introduced in the New York Senate. Senate Bill 9028 called for state-wide compre- 
hensive planning, regional plans and county plans, all compatible and consistent with 
one another. S. 9028, 193rd Leg. Sess. $3 3-106(2), 3-104, 4-101, 4-102(l)(c) (1970). 
County plans were to direct development into high density areas and away from agricul- 
tural and rural lands. Id. $ 3-301. Local governments were to exercise their land use 
authority in conformance with the county plans. Id.  § 3-106(2). These provisions would 
have established an integrated state-wide land use system of the type that was eventu- 
ally adopted in Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. §$ 186.0011187.201 (West 1987 & Supp. 1993) 
(Florida State Comprehensive Planning Act of 1972 and the State Comprehensive Plan), 
and Oregon, OR. REV. STAT. §$ 197.005-860 (1991) (Comprehensive Land Use Planning 
Coordination). The reaction against S. 9028 was so strong that the bill failed to reach the 
full Senate, see 1970 N.Y. LEGIS. REC. & INDEX S. 677, and the administrative agency that 
proposed it was disbanded by the legislature shortly thereafter, 1971 N.Y. LAWS ch. 75, 
$ 11 (eliminating the New York Office of Planning Coordination). 
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planning directives since it was created by the state legislature 
over seven decades ago. I t  is, however, under siege. Its strength 
is being sapped by preemptive state and federal  regulation^;^^ it 
is being attacked in the courts and a sympathetic ear has been 
given to complaints that the system is not working.s6 
Twenty-one years ago, in Golden v. Planning Boards7 the 
New York Court of Appeals called on the state legislature to 
adopt a system of "[sltate-wide or regional control of [land use] 
planning" to "insure that interests broader than that of the mu- 
nicipality underlie various land use po l i~ i e s . "~~  The state's high- 
est court minced no words in 1972, when confronted by a growth 
control ordinance adopted by a single municipality in a growing 
county. It stated that New York's zoning enabling legislation "is 
burdened by the largely antiquated notion which deigns that the 
55. See John R. Nolon, The Erosion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of 
State Interests in Land Use Control, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497 (1993); see also the 
State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA), N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW $ 8  8- 
0101 to 8-0117 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993). SEQRA requires that all public agency 
decisions that affect land use be subjected to a thorough review of their impact on the 
environment. Id. 8-0109(2). The range of actions subject to such review is extensive, 
making the scope of SEQRA nearly coextensive with the scope of land use regulation 
itself. See id.; see also N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 8-0105(6) (McKinney 1984) (defining 
environment as "the physical conditions which will be affected by a proposed action, 
including land, air, water, minerals, flora, fauna, noise, objects of historic or aesthetic 
significance, existing patterns of population concentration, distribution, or growth, and 
existing community or neighborhood character."). Under SEQRA, public agencies are 
authorized to perform Generic Environmental Impact Studies in advance of more partic- 
ular decisions later on. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 617.15 (1987). This author- 
ity is remarkably similar to the authority of local planning boards to adopt "comprehen- 
sive master plans." 
In this law, there is a built-in disincentive to carry out traditional comprehensive 
planning. The SEQRA statute requires environmental planning, broadly defined, of all 
individual land use actions, at  the expense of the applicant. The regulations provide that 
the cost of area-wide Generic Environmental Impact Studies may be imposed on later 
applicants. Id. In this indirect way, the cost of land use planning may be transferred 
from the public sector to the private sector. There is no requirement that such studies 
conform to the local comprehensive plan. Id. Ironically, under existing case law, locally 
and regionally adopted environmental impact studies can become part of the "relevant 
evidence" courts look for in discovering the "comprehensive plan" with which zoning 
actions must conform. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 471-72, 235 N.E.2d 897, 
902, 288 N.Y.S.2d 895-96 (1968). 
56. See infra notes 71 and 322. 
57. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972). 
58. Id. at  376, 285 N.E.2d at  300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at  150; see also Berenson v. Town of 
New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d 236, 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672, 681 (1975). 
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regulation of land use and development is uniquely a function of 
local go~ernment . "~~  Under this system of local control of land 
use, "questions of broader public interest have commonly been 
ignored."60 The court referred to criticisms of community auton- 
omy and commented that local land use control suffers from 
"pronounced insularism" and produces "distortions in metropol- 
itan growth  pattern^."^^ I t  noted that local control had the effect 
of "crippling efforts toward regional and [sltate-wide problem 
solving, be i t  pollut ion,  decen t  housing, or public 
t ransp~r ta t ion ."~~ 
In returning to this subject after twenty years, the court of 
appeals recently confronted the costs of enigmatic land use plan- 
ning in a dramatic setting. In Long Island Pine Barrens Society, 
Inc. u. Planning Board,63 the court reversed a lower court deci- 
sion that had delayed 224 development projects, valued at over 
$11 billion and containing more than 12,000 housing  unit^.^' The 
appellate division had held that the three towns in which these 
projects were located must review the cumulative effect of these 
projects on the drinking water aquifer under the State Environ- 
mental Quality Review Act (SEQRA).e6 
The court of appeals disagreed, noting simply that "[hlere, . 
. . there is no plan . . . I t  found that a general governmental 
policy, contained in a host of local, state and federal laws, 
designed to protect the drinking water aquifer was not the same 
thing as a land use plan.67 Such a plan is the predicate for re- 
quiring an analysis of the cumulative effects of otherwise unre- 
lated projects. The court echoed its earlier sentiments, stating 
that "the existing system of land-use planning in the region is 
plainly not equal to the massive undertaking that effective long- 
range planning would require, and some other system devised by 
59. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 374, 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 148. 
60. Id. 
61. Id., 285 N.E.2d at 299, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 149. 
62. Id. (citations omitted). 
63. 80 N.Y.2d 500, 606 N.E.2d 1373, 591 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1992). 
64. See Josh Barbanel, Court Halts Projects Planned for Pine Barrens, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 12, 1992, at B1. 
65. Long Island Pine Barrens Soc'y, Inc. v. Planning Bd., 178 A.D.2d 18, 29-30, 581 
N.Y.S.2d 803, 809-10 (2d Dep't 1992). 
66. Pine Barrens, 80 N.Y.2d at 514, 606 N.E.2d at 1379, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 988. 
67. Id. at 514-15, 606 N.E.2d at 1379, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 988. 
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a larger planning entity must be s u b s t i t ~ t e d . " ~ ~  The state's high- 
est court referred this matter of "urgent public concern" to the 
state legislature just as it did twenty years ago.ee 
The essential criticism of the land-use planning system is 
that local officials cannot respond to the complex needs of rap- 
idly developing regions or manage the escalating conflict be- 
tween economic development and environmental preservation. . 
Curiously, the critics have taken their frustrations to the courts 
instead of their state legislators, the gatekeepers of this now an- 
cient citadel. While no meaningful reform proposals have been 
discussed in Albany, the courts have been besieged by com- 
p la in t~ .?~  The numerous suits brought by environmentalists to 
block development have been countered by an equal number of 
actions by landowners alleging that land use restrictions violate 
due process or effect a taking of property without just 
c~mpensation.~' 
Under the statutory scheme in New York, the primary 
method of controlling the pace and shape of land development is 
the local zoning ~rdinance.?~ As can be seen readily, the land use 
law in New York closely parallels, and shares the enigmatic na- 
ture of, the historic system described above. The city, town and 
village laws all decree that such zoning regulations shall be in 
accordance with a comprehensive plan.73 In other words, zoning 
must be consistent with local planning. This requirement makes 
obvious sense; how else are courts to judge whether a regulation 
properly advances the public welfare??' Paralleling the national 
system, however, the local planning board is not required to 
68. Id. a t  516, 606 N.E.2d a t  1380, 591 N.Y.S.2d a t  989. 
69. Id. a t  517-18, 606 N.E.2d a t  1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 990. 
70. See supra note 54, and infra notes 71, 86, and 87. 
71. Developer suits of this type are so numerous that they have been characterized 
as a "movement." See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Environmental Laws Face St iff  Test From 
Landowners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, a t  Al. 
72. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW $ 20(24) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. TOWN LAW $ 261 (McKin- 
ney 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7-700 (McKinney 1973). 
73. N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW $ 20(25) (McKinney 1989); N.Y. TOWN LAW $ 263 (McKin- 
ney 1987); N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7-704 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993). 
74. "[Tlhe comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be no 
rational allocation of land use. I t  is the insurance that the public welfare is being served 
and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll." Udell v. Haas, 
21 N.Y.2d 463, 469, 235 N.E.2d 897, 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 893-94 (1968). 
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adopt a plan.76 State law merely provides that local planning 
boards may adopt "a comprehensive master plan" for the com- 
m ~ n i t y . ~ ~  Thus, land use planning in New York is discretionary; 
this is the enigma of mandatory congruency and discretionary 
planning. How can zoning ordinances be required to conform to 
local plans when planning itself is not required? The enigma is 
compounded in the state statutes' delegation of planning and 
zoning authority to different local bodies. Plans are to be 
adopted by an appointed planning board while zoning ordi- 
nances are to be adopted by the elected legislative a~sembly.?~ 
E. The "Land Use Plan" - An Illusory Concept 
The mystery of the land use system in New York is height- 
ened by the lack of clear statutory guidance. The law contains 
no definition of what a land use plan is or what it must contain. 
Under current law, zoning ordinances must be in conformance 
with "a comprehensive plan" yet planning boards are given the 
authority to adopt "a comprehensive master plan."78 These 
terms are not the same and they are not clearly defined by the 
very statutes that place so much legal emphasis on them. 
The statutes offer no definition of a "comprehensive plan" 
a t  all. Only a partial definition of the "comprehensive master 
plan" is provided.7e The legislature has stipulated that a com- 
75. N.Y. GEN. CIW LAW 28-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 1993) (repealed effective 
July 1, 1994, by 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 209); N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (McKinney 1987 & 
Supp. 1993) (repealed effective July 1, 1994, b i  1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 209); N.Y. VILLAGE 
LAW § 7-722 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993) (repealed effective July 1, 1994, by 1993 
N.Y. Laws ch. 209). The legislature repealed these provisions in 1993, adding new lan- 
guage that defines a "comprehensive plan" and gives the local legislative body, rather 
than the planning board, the authority to adopt a comprehensive plan, in its discretion. 
This new law goes into effect on July 1, 1994. 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 209 (to be codified at  
N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 28-a, N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW 17-722). 
76. See supra note 39. 
77. See supra note 39. 
78. Compare N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKinney 1989), and N.Y. TOWN LAW 
3 263 (McKinney 1987), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW 3 7-704 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993) 
(using "comprehensive plan"), with N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 28-a (McKinney 1989 & Supp. 
1993), and N.Y. TOWN LAW § 272-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1993), and N.Y. VILLAGE 
LAW 8 7-722 (McKinney 1973 & Supp. 1993) (using "comprehensive master plan"). See 
supra note 75. 
79. See, e.g., N.Y. TOWN LAW 272-a (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1993). The legisla- 
ture, in 1993, added a definition of the comprehensive plan in the changes made to the 
Town, Village and General City Laws referenced in footnote 75, supra. That definition is 
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prehensive master plan show desirable public facilities such as 
streets, parks, and public buildings. The content of such a plan 
has not been limited, but it must provide for capital facilities at 
a minimum. The lack of clear definitions in the origins of this 
system has not been corrected by legislation in New Y ~ r k . ~ ~  
In the absence of a legislative definition of the comprehen- 
sive plan to which zoning must conform, the judiciary has been 
called frequently to probe this mystery. Judicial decisions have 
provided the following guidelines: 
Zoning can be legal even in the absence of a written plan.8' 
The statutes are satisfied if, implicit in the zoning ordinance 
itself, there is evidence of rational planning.82 
Once a plan is adopted, it does not have to be kept current. 
In such cases, courts will not require "slavish servitude to any 
as follows: 
As used in this section, the term "[town, village, or city] comprehensive plan" 
means the materials, written and/or graphic, including but not limited to maps, 
charts, studies, resolutions, reports and other descriptive material that identify 
the goals, objectives, principles, guidelines, policies, standards, devices and instru- 
ments for the immediate and long-range protection, enhancement, growth and de- 
velopment of the [town, village or city]. The [town, village or city] comprehensive 
plan as herein defined, shall, among other things, serve as a basis for land use 
regulation, infrastructure development, public and private investment, and any 
plans which may detail one or more topics of a [town, village or city] comprehen- 
sive plan. 
See, e.g., 1993 N.Y. Laws ch. 209, 1 1. The law also lists 15 topics that "may" be in- 
cluded in a comprehensive plan. This new law has several apparent effects. It eliminates 
the discretionary authority of planning boards to adopt a "comprehensive master plan," 
rendering the planning board's role in planning ambiguous. It  gives the legislative body 
the discretion to adopt a "comprehensive plan," harmonizing planning terminology with 
zoning terminology, since zoning must be in conformance with a "comprehensive plan." 
See supra note 73. The law may broaden the effects of the comprehensive plan, noting 
that it "shall serve" as the basis for "land use regulation" not just zoning. However, after 
July 1, 1994, when these new provisions go into effect, planning will still be discretionary. 
What is to be included in a plan is also discretionary, and the historic role of the plan- 
ning board in the process is now unclear. Contrast this to the laws of about half the 
states that require local government to adopt plans, define certain elements that must be 
included in a plan, outline the roles of local agencies with clarity and require localities to 
keep their plan up to date. 
80. See infra note 86 regarding proposed legislation to define the comprehensive 
plan. 
81. See Daum v. Meade, 65 Misc. 2d 572,318 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 
1971). 
82. See Randolph v. Town of Brookhaven, 37 N.Y.2d 544, 337 N.E.2d 763, 375 
N.Y.S.2d 315 (1975). 
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particular comprehensive plan," but look rather for "compre- 
hensiveness of planning."83 
In the absence of any plan or the presence of an out-dated 
one, courts will "examin[e] all relevant evidence" of compre- 
hensive planning found in previous land use decisions of the 
locality, including the zoning ordinance itself.84 The circular 
and confusing nature of these judicial definitions is obvious. 
They stand for the general proposition that zoning must serve 
the public interest and that some expression of that interest, 
independent of the zoning enactment itself, is desirable, but 
not always necessary. This tepid expression of the require- 
ment that zoning be "in accordance with" the comprehensive 
plan falls far short of a mandate to adopt a comprehensive 
plan before adopting land use regulations as several state leg- 
islatures have required.86 
F .  Zoning - A Flexible and Illusive Tool 
Another consequence of vague statutory language is that 
zoning in New York has evolved into a flexible, if unpredictable, 
method of land use regulation. The land use statutes in New 
York do not define "comprehensive plan."86 Until very recently, 
they did not define a "variance," a "site plan," a "special use 
83. See Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 188,306 N.E.2d 
155, 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 136 (1973). 
84. See Udell, 21 N.Y.2d a t  471-72, 235 N.E.2d a t  902, 288 N . Y . s . ~ ~  at  895-96. 
85. To some degree, the legislatures or court. of at  least the following states require 
. 
local governments to adopt a comprehensive plan before they are authorized to under- 
take specified forms of land use regulation: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §$ 9-461 and 
9-461.01 to  9-461.12 (1990 & Supp. 1992); California, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860 (West 
1983); Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 9, $ 8  2651-61, 4951-61, 6951-61 (1989); Florida, FLA. 
STAT. ANN. 163.3167(2), 163.3194 (West 1990); Hawaii, HAW. REV. STAT. 5  46-4 (1985 
& Supp. 1992); Idaho, IDAHO CODE $ 5  67-6508, 67-6511 (1989 & Supp  1992); see also 
Dawson Enters., Inc. v. Blaine County, 567 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Idaho 1977) (dictum); Ken- 
tucky, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 100:183, 100.201(2) (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1992); Maine, 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30-A, 4314(1)-(3), 4321-27, 4352 (West Supp. 1992); Mon- 
tana, MONT. CODE ANN. $5 76-1-101 to 76-1-606, 76-2-101 to 76-2-412 (1993); Nebraska, 
NEB. REV. STAT. $8 14-401 to 14-403, 15-1101 to 15-1106, 19-901, 23-174.01 to .09 (1991); 
New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 40:55D-62(a) (West 1991 & Supp. 1992), see also Pop 
Realty Corp. v. Springfield Bd. of Adjustment, 423 A.2d 688 (N.J. Super. 1980); Oregon, 
OR. REV. STAT. § 215.050 (1991); see also Baker v. City of Milwaukie, 533 P.2d 772 (Or. 
1975); Rhode Island, R.I. GEN. LAWS $ 5  45-22.2-1 to 45-22.2-14 (1991 & Supp. 1992). 
86. For a definition of "comprehensive plan" that will take effect in 1994, see supra 
note 79. 
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permit," "transfer of development rights," or "incentive zoning," 
to name just five of a variety of zoning techniques that have 
been used for decades a t  the local level.87 As a direct result of 
this lack of definition, what constitutes zoning has been the sub- 
ject of much debate. The conservative view is that zoning is a 
rigid, district bound technique and that the precise rules must 
be set down in advance of development. Land use attorneys fre- 
quently state, for example, that zoning can control the "use" but 
not the "user" of property.88 These observations are logically de- 
rived from basic due process notions. 
If this view is correct, how do we explain court decisions 
that have articulated the following rules? 
Zoning districts can be created and "float" subject to a re- 
quest by a qualifying landowner for their application to his 
property.8e 
In proper cases, zoning can specify the attributes of people 
who can build, own, and live in certain types of 
 development^.^^ 
Rezoning can be conditioned on the development meeting re- 
quirements demonstrably within the public interest, but not 
contained in the ordinance itself.#' 
Uses can be permitted by special permit, also subject to such 
87. Several of these terms have been defined by amendments to the town and village 
laws due to the work of the New York State Legislative Commission on Rural Resources. 
N.Y. TOWN LAW $ 267(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7-712(1) 
(McKinney Supp. 1993) (defining "variances"); N.Y. TOWN LAW $274-a(1) (McKinney 
Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7-725-a(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (defining "site 
plan"); N.Y. TOWN LAW $274-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7- 
725-b(1) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (defining "special use permit"); N.Y. TOWN LAW $261- 
a(l)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7-701(l)(d) (McKinney Supp. 
1993) (defining "transfer of development rights"); N.Y. TOWN LAW $261-b(l)(e) (McKin- 
ney Supp. 1993) and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7-703(1)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1993) (defining 
"incentive zoning"); see James A. Coon and Sheldon W. Damsky, Revisions to State 
Zoning Laws Enacted, MUN. LAW., Sept.-Oct. 1991, at  1; Terry Rice, Statutory Changes 
Provide for Incentive Zoning, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 13, 1991, a t  40. 
88. See Vlahos Realty Co. v. Little Boar's Head Dist., 146 A.2d 257, 260 (N.H. 1958) 
("[Zloning conditions and regulations are designed to regulate the land itself and its use 
and not the person who owns and operates the premises by whom such use is to be 
exercised."). 
89. See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951). 
90. See Maldini v. Ambro, 36 N.Y.2d 481,330 N.E.2d 403, 369 N.Y.S.2d 385 (1975). 
91. See Church v. Town of Islip, 8 N.Y.2d 254, 168 N.E.2d 680, 203 N.Y.S.2d 866 
(1960). 
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 condition^.^^ 
Waivers of requirements can be given in the interest of 
achieving a planned unit development, integrating diverse 
land uses in an otherwise single-use district.e3 
Variances from zoning requirements may be granted if the 
"spirit" of the law is not violated by them.94 
The lack of clarity and definition in New York land law has 
enabled local officials to invent this impressive array of "zoning" 
tools. These devices have been sustained by the courts when 
they meet the illusive requirement of being in accordance with 
the comprehensive plan.e6 In sustaining Tarrytown's adoption of 
a "floating zone," for example, the New York Court of Appeals 
sanctioned inventive zoning with these words: "If, therefore, an 
ordinance is enacted in accordance with a comprehensive zoning 
plan, it is not 'spot zoning,' even though it (1) singles out and 
affects but one small plot . . . or (2) creates in the center of a 
large zone small areas or districts devoted to a different use."es 
Judge Conway, in dissent, was incredulous that Tarrytown could 
create a zoning technique so a t  odds with traditional Euclidian 
zoning, which emphasizes the rigid separation of land uses. He 
characterized Tarrytown's action as "unprecedented," "most as- 
suredly not 'zoning,' " "unauthorized by the Village Law of this 
State, which is the sole source of the board's power to act," "at 
odds with all sound zoning theory and practice" and "the open- 
ing wedge in the destruction of effective and efficient zoning in 
this State."e7 
In the absence of clear rules and definitions to guide local 
land use control, local regulators have enjoyed great flexibility to 
act to respond to emergent needs. This has been the singular 
strength of the historic land use system. The advantage of this 
flexibility, the diversity of local needs in New York, the strength 
92. See Penny Arcade, Inc. v. Town Bd., 75 A.D.2d 620, 427 N.Y.S.2d 52 (2d Dep't 
1980). 
93. See Ahearn v.  Zoning Bd. of App., 158 A.D.2d 801, 551 N.Y.S.2d 392 (3d Dep't), 
motion for leave to appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 706, 561 N.E.2d 888, 560 N.Y.S.2d 988 
(1990). 
94. See Aucello v. Moylan, 60 Misc. 2d 1094, 304 N.Y.S.2d 765 (Sup. Ct. Westches- 
ter County 1969). 
95. See supra note 73 and text accompanying. 
96. Rodgers, 302 N.Y. at 124, 96 N.E.2d at 735 (citation omitted). 
97. Id. at 126-27, 96 N.E.2d at 736 (Conway, J., dissenting). 
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of the "home rule" tradition,Oe and the difficulty of altering de 
facto patterns of regulation are but a few reasons that explain 
why the state legislature has proceeded with caution in re- 
forming this system. 
G.  Local Zoning is Required to Respect Regional Needs 
I t  is perhaps the failure of local land use regulation to con- 
sider its inter-municipal impacts, and the lack of any technique 
that requires an accounting for them, that call most convincingly 
for reform. The courts have required that local zoning consider 
regional needs.s9 For two decades New York's highest court has 
urged the legislature to reform the land use system to facilitate 
such considera t i~n. '~~ Its decisions reflect these propositions: 
That growth naturally occurring in the private market must 
be accommodated by localities, subject to reasonable growth 
management requirements.'O1 
That meeting the needs of the people of the state generally 
must be an objective of local land use regulation; the welfare 
of the landowners and citizens within the geographical 
boundaries of the community is not the sole end of land use 
regulation.lo2 
That local governments are not competent, by themselves, to 
measure regional needs and decide how to accommodate 
them.'03 
That state and regional agencies should articulate such needs 
and explain to local governments the extent to which they 
98. For an explanation of the very limited extent to which local "home rule" power 
constrains the state legislature from acting in the land use area, see Nolon, supra note 
55. 
99. See, e.g., Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at  110, 341 N.E.2d a t  243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at  681; 
Golden, 30 N.Y.2d a t  376, 285 N.E.2d at  300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at  150. 
100. See supra notes 53-65 and accompanying text; see also Pine Barrens, 80 
N.Y.2d at  517-18, 606 N.E.2d at  1381, 591 N.Y.S.2d at  990; Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at  111, 
341 N.E.2d at  243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at  682; Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at  376, 285 N.E.2d at  301, 
334 N.Y.S.2d at  150. 
101. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 377-79, 285 N.E.2d at 301-02, 334 N.Y.S.2d at  151-53; see 
also, Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843 (Sup. 
Ct. Westchester County 1957). 
102. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d at  111, 341 N.E.2d at  242-43, 378 N.Y.S.2d at  681. 
103. Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at 375-76, 285 N.E.2d a t  300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at  149-50. 
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must meet such needs.lO' 
These judicial tenets reflect the notion that, since local zon- 
ing authority is derived from the state's police power, zoning 
must be exercised with the broader interests of the state in 
mind.lo5 How these broader interests are to be articulated, and 
localities to be accountable to them, is the key question of land 
law reform in New York. Although the state legislature has be- 
gun the reform process by adding needed definitions and clarity 
to the law, this issue has yet to be addressed in any meaningful 
and formal way.loe 
H. Legislative Inaction 
What the state legislature has not done is now easier to 
evaluate. The list of omissions is impressive: 
Cogent planning regions of the ' state have not been 
104. Pine Barrens, 80 N.Y.2d a t  516, 606 N.E.2d at  1380, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 989; Ber- 
enson, 38 N.Y.2d at 111, 341 N.E.2d at  243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at  682; Golden, 30 N.Y.2d at  
376, 285 N.E.2d at  300, 334 N.Y.S.2d at  150. 
105. For example, the court in Berenson stated: 
[I]n enacting a zoning ordinance, consideration must be given to regional needs 
and requirements. . . . Although we are aware of the traditional view that zoning 
acts only upon the property lying within the zoning board's territorial limits, i t  
must be recognized that zoning often has a substantial impact beyond the bounda- 
ries of the municipality. 
Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d a t  110, 341 N.E.2d a t  242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at  681. 
106. For a recent statutory amendment that promotes intergovernmental coopera- 
tion among local governments regarding land use planning and regulation, see 1992 N.Y. 
LAWS ch. 724 (codified at  N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW $ 20-g (McKinney Supp. 19931, N.Y. TOWN 
LAW $ 284 (McKinney Supp. 1993), and N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7-741 (McKinney Supp. 
1993)). Area-wide land use plans may be adopted by county governments, but few have 
entered the field. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW $ 239-d (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1993). The 
legal effect of county land use plans is not clearly defined, although court decisions give 
them a presumption of legislative validity, if adopted by the county legislature. Blitz v. 
Town of New Castle, 94 A.D.2d 92, 463 N.Y.S.2d 832 (2d Dep't 1983). Counties may 
comment on local actions which affect land proximate to county facilities and municipal 
boundaries, but the effect of their negative comment is only to require a majority plus 
one vote on the matter at  the local level. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW $ 239-m (McKinney 1986 
& Supp. 1993). It  is hard to tell whether this is helpful or simply a further complication, 
particularly in the absence of a county land use plan. For a complete discussion of the 
statutory history of regional and county authority in New York, see generally Patricia E. 
Salkin, Regional Planning in New York State: A State Rich in National Models, Yet 
Weak in Overall Statewide Planning Coordination, 13 PACE L. REV. 505 (1993). For a 
national review of trends in regional governance, including a discussion of regional regu- 
latory agencies, see generally John Kincaid, Regulatory Regionalism in Metropolitan Ar- 
eas: Voter Resistance and Reform Persistence, 13 PACE L. REV. 449 (1993). 
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delineated. 
Regional needs have not been identified. 
The extent of local responsibility for accommodating such 
needs has not been articulated. 
Local planning is not required or seriously encouraged even in 
areas of the state undergoing development pressure or where 
critical natural resources exist. 
What a local plan is and what it must include have not been 
defined. 
There is no administrative review of whether local plans are 
consistent with state-wide or regional objectives.lo7 
I. T h e  Vulnerability o f  Land Use Regulations to Attack 
As a result of these legal incongruities, zoning and other 
regulations designed to control growth or to protect the environ- 
ment are vulnerable to attack.lo8 As demonstrated above, land 
use planning is the historical basis of land use regulation. The 
two were designed, however unartfully, to go together. Planning 
insulated regulation from the pressures of politics. I t  provided a 
reasonable basis for limitations on the use of private land in the 
public interest. It follows that when regulations are adopted 
without reference to planning objectives or, worse, are contrary 
to such objectives, they are vulnerable to attack. If planning is 
not done, if it is not specific, or if i t  is not up to date, and if 
regulations are not buoyed by the plan, the base on which land 
use regulations rest is infirm. This makes a strong case for fun- 
damental reform of the legislative system under which land use 
regulations operate. 
In the litigious climate created by the clash in society be- 
tween property rights advocates and land regulators, regulating 
107. A number o f  states with land use systems similar to  New York's have reformed 
the law by establishing a more coherent and integrated system. These reforms tend to 
eliminate the deficiencies in the New York system that are listed here. See Douglas R. 
Porter, State Growth Management: The Intergovernmental Experiment, 13 PACE L. 
REV. 481, 484-500 (1993); Henry R. Richmond, From Sea to Shining Sea: Manifest 
Destiny and the National Land Use Dilemma, 13 PACE L. REV. 327,347-50 (1993); supra 
note 85. 
108. So much litigation has been brought contesting the validity o f  local land use 
regulation that this activity in the courts has been called a "movement." SCHNEIDER, 
supra note 71, at Al .  
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in a planning void is inadvi~able . '~~ This is particularly so in 
light of personal liability suits brought against regulators and 
their agencies.l1° In the next part, this article examines how the 
failure to honor the "in accordance with" provision of the land 
law can subject regulations to a variety of attacks by aggrieved 
property owners. 
111. Failure to Plan Subjects Land Use Regulations to Attack 
A. An Illustrative Case 
In Udell v. Haas,ll1 a property owner contested the reclas- 
sification of his property from a business to a residential use by 
the Village of Lake Success on Long Island. The court began its 
analysis, as it should, by looking for the village's comprehensive 
plan. It understood that "the comprehensive plan is the essence 
of zoning."ll* The court noted two defects in land use regulation 
that occur when comprehensive planning is missing. The first 
was that "[wlithout [a plan], there can be no rational allocation 
of land use. It is the insurance that the public welfare is being 
served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just 
a Gallup poll."l13 The second was that "the 'comprehensive plan' 
protects the landowner from arbitrary restrictions on the use of 
his property which can result from the pressures which outraged 
voters can bring to bear on public  official^.""^ 
Lake Success had not adopted a "comprehensive master 
109. In the absence of a cogent plan which ties land use regulations to clearly stated 
public objectives, developers and landowners can not know what to develop and where; 
courts find it difficult to judge the reasonableness of local regulations. This lack of guid- 
ance begins to explain why land use regulation is so tedious, expensive and time 
consuming. 
110. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) ("Every person who, under color of any statute . . . 
subject[s], . . . any citizen . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured . . . ."I. 
111. 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968). 
112. Id. at  469, 235 N.E.2d at  900-01,288 N.Y.S.2d a t  893. The court also references 
"[tlhe almost universal statutory requirement that zoning conform to a 'well considered 
plan'. . . . (See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, U.S. Dept. of Commerce [I9261 
(sic))." Id., 235 N.E.2d at  900, 288 N.Y.S.2d a t  893. 
113. Id., 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  893-94. 
114. Id., 235 N.E.2d at  901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  894. "[Tlhere is a danger that zoning, 
considered as a self-contained activity rather than as a means to a broader end, may 
tyrannize individual property owners." Id. (quoting Charles M. Haar, In  Accordance 
With a Comprehensive Plan, 68 HARV. L. REV. 1154, 1157-58 (1955)). 
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plan;" therefore, there was no single document that could consti- 
tute a "comprehensive plan."115 As a result, the court was forced 
to deal with the enigmatic nature of the New York State land 
use system. Since planning is not required, and what constitutes 
a plan is not specified by law, the court had to define a judicial 
strategy for determining whether this rezoning conformed, as re- 
quired, to a comprehensive plan."' 
This was the moment in the historical development of New 
York's planning law for the highest court to determine how to 
interpret the "in accordance with" requirement. Did the zoning 
ordinance itself constitute the plan?l17 Did zoning have to con- 
form to a separate, independent, comprehensive planning docu- 
ment?lls Was evidence of comprehensive planning in the adop- 
tion of zoning enough to satisfy the requirement?l1° 
The Court of Appeals began its analysis by "examining all 
relevant evidence."120 In the absence of an adopted plan, it 
looked at  the zoning ordinance and zoning map for evidence of 
comprehensive planning.121 It also reviewed a 1958 zoning 
amendment that was entitled a "development policy" for the vil- 
lage.122 This policy articulated a vision of the village as a low- 
density, single-family community with commercial development 
only in peripheral areas.123 The plaintiffs land was in such an 
area and had been classified by the zoning ordinance, prior to 
the contested rezoning, as business ~ r 0 p e r t y . l ~ ~  
Having discovered the plan for the community in this piece- 
meal fashion, adopting in the process the "evidence of compre- 
hensive planning" standard for interpreting the "in accordance 
115. Id., 21 N.Y.2d a t  472, 235 N.E.2d at  902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896. 
116. Id. at  472-76, 235 N.E.2d at  902-05, 288 N.Y.S.2d a t  896-99. 
117. For an early New York case taking this view, see Harris v. Village of Dobbs 
Ferry, 208 A.D. 853, 204 N.Y.S. 325 (2d Dep't 1924). This case was decided before the 
adoption of the Standard City Planning Enabling Act. See supra note 29. 
118. See, e.g., Fasno v. Board of County Comm'rs, 507 P.2d 23 (Or. 1973). 
119. See Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 104 A.2d 7 (Pa. 1970). 
120. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d a t  471, 235 N.E.2d at  902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  895. Development 
policies "may be garnered from any available source, most especially the master plan of 
the community, if any has been adopted, the zoning law itself and the zoning map." Id. 
a t  472, 235 N.E.2d a t  902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  896. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at  472-73, 235 N.E.2d at  902-03, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  896. 
124. Id. at  466-67, 235 N.E.2d at  899, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  891-92. 
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with" requirement,12"t was not hard for the court to determine 
that the rezoning, which diminished plaintiffs property value by 
sixty percent, was not in conformance with comprehensive plan- 
ning.lZ6 In constitutional terms, the land use action of the'village 
violated substantive due process;127 it was not designed to ac- 
complish a valid public objective.lZ8 In statutory terms, the ac- 
tion was beyond the powers of the village since it did not con- 
form to the plan.lZ9 "Hence [the] ordinance . . . must be held t o  
be ultra uireslsO as not meeting the requirements o f .  . . the Vil- 
lage Law that zoning be 'in conformance with a comprehensive 
plan.' "lS1 
The plaintiff also complained that the reclassification of his 
land was d i s c r i m i n a t ~ r y . ~ ~ ~  The court used a narrow inquiry to 
review this allegation. "The issue is the propriety of the treat- 
ment of the subject parcel as compared to neighboring proper- 
ties."ls3 The evidence provided by the plaintiff established that 
other similarly situated properties were allowed to be used for 
business uses, leading the court to agree that the rezoning was 
( 6 .  discriminatory.lS4 Discrimination, said the court, is a wrong 
125. Id. a t  472, 235 N.E.2d at  902, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  896. This interpretation of the 
"in accordance with" requirement is that there must exist evidence of comprehensive 
planning in the adoption of zoning, which would satisfy the requirement. See supra note 
116. 
New York has never interpreted its statute (which follows the Standard Zoning 
Enabling Act) to  require the adoption of an independent comprehensive plan, but 
has been willing to find the land-use policies of a community in a comprehensive 
plan, if one exists, as well as in the zoning ordinance and zoning map. 
HOUSING FOR ALL UNDER LAW 364 (Richard P. Fishman ed., 1978) (citing Udell, 21 
N.Y.2d a t  471-72, 235 N.E.2d a t  902, 288 N.Y.S.2d a t  895). 
126. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at  476, 235 N.E.2d at  904-05, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  899. 
127. See infra notes 150-175 and accompanying text. 
128. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at  475-76, 235 N.E.2d a t  904-05, 288 N.Y.S.2d a t  898-99. 
129. Id. a t  476, 235 N.E.2d a t  905, 288 N.Y.S.2d a t  899. "Such [zoning] regulations 
shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan . . . ." N.Y. VILLAGE LAW $ 7-704 
(McKinney 1973). 
130. The Latin phrase "ultra oires" (beyond the power) is frequently used by the 
courts to characterize a local land use regulation taken outside of the local government's 
authority. See, e.g., Moriarty v. Planning Bd., 119 A.D.2d 188, 196, 506 N.Y.S.2d 184,189 
(2d Dep't 1986), infra notes 201-06. 
131. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at  476, 235 N.E.2d at  905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  899. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at  476-77, 235 N.E.2d a t  905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  899-900. 
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done to the community's land use control scheme."136 
The court also found fault with the process by which the 
rezoning was accomplished. I t  wrote, "the process by which a 
zoning revision is carried out is important in determining . . . 
[its] validity . . . ."138 The facts showed that the development 
policies of the community were clear when, on the morning of 
June 21, 1960, the plaintiffs representative appeared a t  the vil- 
lage offices with a plan for the business development of the 
property.137 That evening, the village planning board recom- 
mended a change in zoning from business to residential use.138 
Within a month, the rezoning was acc~mplished. '~~ 
The court characterized this process as a "rush to the stat- 
ute books,"140 and found that the rezoning was not "accom- 
plished in a proper, careful and reasonable manner."'"' "The 
amendment was not the result of a deliberate change in commu- 
nity policy and was enacted without sufficient forethought or 
~lanning."'"~ This amounted to a violation of procedural guaran- 
tees. Planning is more than the substantive result. I t  is also a 
process, aptly described by the court as careful, reasonable and 
deliberate.143 The failure to plan properly in Lake Success led to 
a finding that the rezoning violated procedural due process 
guarantees.'"" 
The village's failure to conform its regulation of the plain- 
tiffs land to its comprehensive plan led to the invalidation of 
the contested action on four separate grounds. I t  did not meet 
either s~bstantive'"~ or procedural due process tests,148 it  was 
135. Id. at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899. See infra notes 187-99 and 
accompanying text. 
136. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 474, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 897. 
137. Id. at 473, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. 
138. Id., 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 897. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. at 474, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 897. 
141. Id. at 475, 235 N.E.2d at 904, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899 (quoting Rodgers v. Village 
of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 122, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1951)). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 469-70, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894. 
144. Id. at 474, 235 N.E.2d at 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 903. See infra notes 176-86 and 
text accompanying. 
145. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 476, 235 N.E.2d at 905, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 899. 
146. Id. at 473-74, 235 N.E.2d at 903, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 896-97. 
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beyond the village's legal authority,14' and it was discriminatory, 
in violation of the plaintiffs equal protection rights.148 
The message is clear. Over thirty years ago, the courts gave 
landowners a checklist to use in analyzing whether land use ac- 
tions are proper.14B All of them emanate from the land use plan. 
If a plan is developed in an orderly way, if it is reasonable, and 
if it can be shown that the regulation achieves one of its objec- 
tives, it is likely that a contested regulation will withstand at- 
tack on all four of these grounds. Each of these lines of attack 
on a land use regulation and how the failure to meet the "in 
accordance with" requirement can be fatal to a regulation are 
explored in greater depth in the material that follows. 
B. Substantive Due Process 
The Udell case demonstrates that a land use regulation 
must not be arbitrary or capricious; it must be reasonably re- 
lated to the achievement of a valid public purpose to comply 
with substantive due process guarantees of the Fifth Amend- 
ment of the Federal Cons t i t~ t ion . '~~  In the seminal zoning case, 
Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,161 the U.S. Supreme 
Court established the standard of review to be used by the 
courts when the wisdom of a regulatory scheme is challenged on 
147. Id .  a t  476, 235 N.E.2d at  905, 288 N.Y.S.2d a t  899. 
148. Id .  at  477, 235 N.E.2d at  906, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  900. 
149. See supra notes 145-48 and text accompanying. The checklist is developed by 
the court in its substantive review of the four charges made by the plaintiff in Udell v. 
Haas. 
150. The Fifth Amendment states that "no person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. A similar limita- 
tion on government action is applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. In New York, this "due process" requirement is contained in 
the New York Constitution, using language virtually identical to that of the U.S. Consti- 
tution. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Due process has been characterized as both substantive 
and procedural. Substantive due process is concerned with the essential fairness of the 
action of government. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990). In the property reg- 
ulation field, the issues are whether the regulation is designed to accomplish a valid pub- 
lic purpose and is reasonable and fair. Procedural due process concerns the "process" 
that is followed in the adoption of regulations that affect property rights. Apart from the 
substantive content of the regulation, it must be adopted and administered in a way that 
treats affected interests fairly, giving them notice and a reasonable chance to be heard 
before an accessible and impartial tribunal. DANIEL R. MANDELKE*, LAND USE LAW 58-60 
(2d ed. 1988). 
151. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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due process grounds. "[Tlhe reasons [must be] sufficiently co- 
gent to preclude us from saying, as it must be said before the 
ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions 
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial re- 
lation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."162 
Failure to conform with a comprehensive plan risks violating 
this standard of review. 
In McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay,163 the substantive due 
process tests of a land use regulation were reviewed. The case is 
a reminder that a land use regulation must meet a two part test 
to satisfy substantive due process. First, the zoning ordinance 
"must have been enacted in furtherance of a legitimate govern- 
mental purpose."1s4 Second, "there must be a reasonable rela- 
tion between the end sought to be achieved by the regulation 
and the means used to achieve that end."lS5 
The Oyster Bay zoning ordinance restricted the occupancy 
of single-family housing to any number of persons related by 
blood, marriage or adoption, or to two persons not so related but 
who are sixty-two years of age or 01der.l~~ The plaintiffs had 
rented their four-bedroom home to four unrelated young men. 
The dispositive issue was whether the zoning ordinance could 
restrict the use of single-family homes in this fashion.lS7 The 
Court of Appeals found that there was a "legitimate governmen- 
tal purpose" in preserving the "character of traditional single- 
152. Id. at  395. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962) 
("Indulging in the usual presumption of constitutionality, . . . we find no indication that 
the . . . Ordinance . . . is unconstitutional. . . . [TJhis court has often said that 'debatable 
questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the legislature. . . .' " (quot- 
ing Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932))). This United States Supreme Court 
standard of review has been adopted in New York for zoning cases challenged on due 
process grounds: 
[Dlecision as to how a community shall be zoned or rezoned, as to how various 
properties shall be classified or reclassified, rests with the local legislative body; its 
judgment and determination will be conclusive, beyond interference from the 
courts, unless shown to be arbitrary, and.the burden of establishing such arbitrari- 
ness is imposed upon him who asserts it. 
Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 121, 96 N.E.2d 731, 733 (1951). 
153. 66 N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985). 
154. Id. at  549, 488 N.E.2d at  1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  130. 
155. Id., 488 N.E.2d at  1242, 498 N.Y.S.2d at  130-31. 
156. Id. at  547-48, 488 N.E.2d at  1241-42, 498 N.Y.S.2d a t  130. 
157. Id. at  547, 488 N.E.2d at  1241, 498 N.Y.S.2d at  129. 
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family neighborhoods, reduction of parking and traffic problems, 
control of population density and prevention of noise and dis- 
tu rban~e . " '~~  However, the court found that the means of 
achieving this purpose was not reasonably related to that end. 
The provision was characterized as a violation of the plaintiffs 
due process rights; as restrictions based on the size of the house- 
hold were reasonably related to the achievement of the town's 
legitimate purpose, but those based on the type of relations 
among the occupants of a house were not.16B 
In Kraizberg v. Shankey,lBO the plaintiffs sought an exten- 
sion of the existing town sewer district to serve their property, 
but were denied based upon an alleged lack of capacity at the 
town's central sewage plant and attendant infiltration and inflow 
problems. The supreme court annulled the town board's denial 
because the findings were not supported by the evidence.161 The 
appellate division affirmed this holding. In addition, the appel- 
late division found that even though the town board had the 
power to create sewer improvement districts,lB2 its decision was 
not based upon "a determination of the public interest but upon 
the desire of town residents and the Board to minimize develop- 
ment."lB3 The Board's determination was thus "arbitrary and 
capricious," lacking support by substantial evidence.lB4 
In Walus u. Mil l ing t~n , '~~ ' the  failure to show reasons for 
deviating from the plan constituted spot zoning and was fatal to 
the rezoning of an individual parcel.lBB The plaintiffs challenged 
the validity of a zoning ordinance reclassifying the defendant's 
parcel from single-family residential to general business.lB7 
158. Id. at  549, 488 N.E.2d at  1243, 498 N.Y.S.2d at  131. 
159. Id. 
160. 167 A.D.2d 370, 561 N.Y.S.2d 600 (2nd Dep't 1990). 
161. Id. a t  371, 561 N.Y.S.2d at  601. 
162. Id. (noting N.Y. TOWN LAW 3 190 (McKinney 1987)). 
163. Id; see also Town of Orangetown v. Magee, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 30, 1992, a t  30 (Sup. 
Ct. Rockland Co., Stolarik, J.) (reversing denial of a building permit because of clear 
evidence that the denial was based on the local officials' desire to placate constituents 
rather than to further legitimate public purposes). 
164. Kraizberg, 167 A.D.2d at  371, 561 N.Y.S.2d at 601. 
165. 49 Misc. 2d 104, 266 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1966). 
166. Id. at  108, 266 N.Y.S.2d at  389. See Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 
115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951) (single parcel rezoning is not illegal spot zoning if it is in 
accord with sound planning principles); see infra notes 177-91 and text accompanying. 
167. Walus, 49 Misc. 2d at  105, 266 N.Y.S.2d at  836. 
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Other than a few nonconforming uses within the general vicin- 
ity, the area was primarily developed as a single-family residen- 
tial neighborhood. The application for reclassification was to al- 
low the construction of a restaurant and eventually a motel.les 
The appellate division invalidated the rezoning because it 
was not in accordance with the "comprehensive plan" of the 
community. The court stated that "an underlying purpose [of 
comprehensive planning is] to control land uses for the benefit 
of the whole community based upon consideration of the com- 
munity's problems and . . . a general policy to obtain a uniform 
result."16B In addition, "it requires a consideration of the indi- 
vidual parcel's relationship to the community as a whole."170 
"[Tlhe requirement is that a plan be implicit in the zoning regu- 
lation as a whole and that the amendments be consistent with 
such [a] plan and not be enacted on a piecemeal or haphazard 
basis."171 Therefore, if the amendment benefits the community 
as a whole, any incidental benefit or detriment to the owners or 
neighboring property does not invalidate the legislation. 
These three cases, McMinn, Kraizberg, and Walus, illus- 
trate the vulnerability of regulations that are not clearly con- 
nected to the advancement of an objective of a comprehensive 
~1an. l '~  In McMinn, there was no evidence that the regulatory 
means chosen by the town advanced a valid planning objec- 
t i ~ e . ' ~ ~  In Kraizberg, the dangers of not integrating local plans, 
such as the capital infrastructure budget, the official map and 
the comprehensive plan were demonstrated.17' In Walus, it was 
fatal to a regulation that it was not part of the planning whole 
but was instead enacted on a piecemeal or haphazard basis.176 In 
168. Id. 
169. Id. a t  108, 266 N.Y.S.2d at  839; see also Cannon v. Murphy, 600 N.Y.S.2d 965 
(2d Dep't 1993). 
170. Id. a t  109, 266 N.Y.S.2d a t  839 (citing Connell v. Town of Granby, 12 A.D.2d 
177, 209 N.Y.S.2d 379 (4th Dep't 1961)). 
171. Id. 
172. See also South Gwinett Venture v. Pruitt, 491 F.2d 5 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 837 (1974). "It necessarily follows that upon a factual showing of arbitrariness 
there must be some basis in fact and law to justify the zoning action as consistent with 
reasonableness." Id. a t  7. 
173. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. 
174. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
175. See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
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each of these cases, there was no evidence that the regulations 
were enacted to further a specific public planning objective. The 
courts in these cases cautioned municipalities from regulating in 
the absence of conscientious planning. 
C. Procedural Due Process 
Land use regulations must adhere to procedural guarantees 
.secured by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment of 
the U.S. Cons t i t~ t ion . ' ~~  Procedural due process concerns the 
"process" that is followed in the adoption of regulations that af- 
fect property rights. Apart from the substantive content of a 
regulation, it must be adopted and administered in a way that 
treats affected interests fairly, giving them notice and a reasona- 
ble chance to be heard before a tribunal that is accessible and 
impartial. 
The failure of an agency to follow an orderly and logical 
process in enacting a land use regulation can be fatal to a regula- 
tion's validity. Recall that in Udell the rezoning was not "ac- 
complished in a proper, careful and reasonable manner."17' Sim- 
ilarly, in Pokoik u. S i l ~ d o r f , ' ~ ~  the town's dilatory tactics 
resulted in the invalidation of the rezoning of plaintiffs prop- 
erty. The plaintiff sought to annul the decision of the building 
inspector and town zoning board of appeals that denied a build- 
ing permit.17e The plaintiffs application for a building permit to 
construct two additional bedrooms was originally rejected be- 
cause of previous zoning  violation^.'^^ The plaintiff revised the 
building plans, but the building inspector did not act upon 
them. A court order compelling the building inspector's action 
on the application was granted nine months later, but the appli- 
cation was denied three months after issuance of the order.18' 
The plaintiff appealed to the zoning board of appeals, but was 
forced to reschedule the hearing because no one appeared on be- 
176. See supra note 150. 
177. See supra note 141. 
178. 40 N.Y.2d 769, 358 N.E.2d 874, 390 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1976). 
179. Id. at 770, 358 N.E.2d at 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 50. 
180. Id. Plaintiff violated the zoning restrictions by renting rooms in a residential 
district without a license. Moreover, the application for a building permit did not explain 
why plaintiff needed the additional room. Thus, the application was rejected. Id.  
181. Id .  
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half of the town. Meanwhile, the town board of trustees 
amended the zoning ordinance, limiting one-family residences to 
four bedrooms. This was a new requirement that would be vio- 
lated by the plaintiffs revised plans.lsa The ordinance became 
effective prior to the plaintiffs hearing, resulting in the denial of 
the building permit. The special term annulled this decision, but 
the appellate division reversed, finding the amended ordinance 
controlling because it was effective at  the time of the hearing.lS3 
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the amended 
ordinance could not apply, and finding that the dilatory tactics 
of the town board and building inspector were a "special facts 
exception" to the rule that zoning amendments may be made a t  
anytime in the public interest.ls4 The plaintiffs full compliance 
with the zoning requirements at  the time of the revised applica- 
tion created a right to the permit. The plaintiff was denied his 
right to begin construction before the effective date of the 
amendment because of the "abuse of administrative procedure" 
by the village officials.lS6 The Court held that where a town 
board has abused administrative procedures in amending its 
zoning ordinance, that amendment may not be used to invali- 
date an application for a permit.ls6 
The faulty proceedings in Pokoik are symptomatic of what 
happens when land use is regulated in the absence of systematic 
planning, of clear objectives and of a determined and demon- 
182. Id. at  771, 358 N.E.2d at 875, 390 N.Y.S.2d a t  50. 
183. Id .  at  772, 358 N.E.2d at 876, 390 N.Y.S.2d a t  51. 
184. Id. at  772-73, 358 N.E.2d at  876, 390 N.Y.S.2d a t  51. 
185. Id.  at  773, 358 N.E.2d at 876, 390 N.Y.S.2d a t  51. 
186. Id., 358 N.E.2d at  876-77, 390 N.Y.S.2d at  51-52; see also Golisano v. Town 
Bd., 31 A.D.2d 85, 296 N.Y.S.2d 623 (4th Dep't 1968). The absence of comprehensive 
planning principles to justify a rezoning was transparent in the court's analysis of the 
denial of the plaintiffs application for a building permit. The court noted that the town 
board had cited fifteen reasons for denial of the permit, but these were "groping" and 
without merit because no rationale for rezoning to increase the size of a building lot was 
given. Id. at  88, 296 N.Y.S.2d at  626. The town board "abused administrative procedure" 
by trying to conceal its desire to delay the application with insufficient reasons for de- 
nial. Id. Due to this abuse, the court invoked the "special facts exception." Id .  It held 
that where a town .board has abused administrative procedures in the exercise of its 
zoning powers, this "special facts exception" will prevent a subsequent zoning amend- 
ment from justifying a denial of the plaintiffs application for a permit. Id.  Thus, the 
amended ordinance did not apply and the arbitrary decision of the board was annulled. 
Id., 296 N.Y.S.2d at  627. 
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strable strategy to achieve them. Operating in a planning void 
heightens the risk of having a court characterize the operating 
method as dilatory and abusive, a violation of the guarantee of 
procedural due process. This reinforces the historical reliance on 
planning before regulation and proceeding according to that 
plan. 
D. Equal Protection Violation 
Udell u. Haas further established that a land use regulation 
may not discriminate unfairly against a particular owner or class 
of owners in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.lB7 This 
guarantee provides a landowner with the ability to attack the 
validity of a land use regulation in two ways, either by attacking 
the regulation on its face or by attacking the regulation as ap- 
plied to a plaintiffs land.lBS 
In Osiecki u. Town of Huntington,lBB a regulation that de- 
parted from the comprehensive plan was invalidated for failure 
to articulate planning reasons for the deviation. In this 1991 
case, the plaintiffs challenged the low-density residential classifi- 
cation of their five and one-half acre parcel. The plaintiffs 
claimed a violation of their equal protection rights, pointing to 
nearby properties that were zoned and developed commercially 
in conformance with a master plan adopted in 1965.1e0 The plan 
designated the entire block, including the subject property, for 
commercial de~elopment.'~' 
187. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d a t  477-78, 235 N.E.2d a t  906, 288 N.Y.S.2d at  900-01. The 
Fourteenth Amendment states that "[nlo State shall make or enforce any law . . . nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. 
amend. XIV, % 1; see also N.Y. CONST. art. I, 3 11. Owners may contest the regulation of 
their property if they have evidence that similarly situated properties are not so affected. 
Equal protection attacks may also be brought on other grounds, such as race, poverty or 
age. Equal protection attacks on land use regulation are often intertwined with charges 
that such regulations violate the plaintiffs constitutional due process rights. See 
MANDELKER, supra note 150, at 61. 
188. If there is no logical difference between plaintiffs property and an adjacent 
property which was classified more favorably, then the regulation is attacked as applied 
to plaintiffs land. See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
189. 170 A.D.2d 490, 565 N.Y.S.2d 564 (2d Dep't 1991). 
190. Id. at  490, 565 N.Y.S.2d a t  565. 
191. Id. at  491, 565 N.Y.S.2d a t  565. 
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Using the vocabulary of other comprehensive plan cases, the 
town argued that it was not obliged to "slavish servitude to the 
master plan" and that it could change the use of the plaintiffs' 
property.lSa A search of the record showed no reason articulated 
by the town justifying a departure from the adopted plan. As  a 
result, the zoning of plaintiffs property was voided since it was 
not in compliance with comprehensive planning. Otherwise, 
"[tlo accept the Town's contention that it is free to determine 
that the master plan should no longer be followed, without artic- 
ulating a reason for that determination, would invite the kind of 
ad hoc and arbitrary application of zoning power that the com- 
prehensive planning requirement was designed to avoid."193 
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center Inc.,lS4 involved 
a city ordinance that prevented a group home from being placed 
in the community. The Court considered whether the mentally 
retarded constituted a quasi-suspect class meriting an interme- 
diate level of judicial scrutiny, somewhere between the strict 
scrutiny applied to regulations affecting a constitutionally pro- 
tected, or "suspect" class, and the rational relationship standard 
applied to groups not specially protected by the Const i tut i~n. '~~ 
The plaintiff sought to lease a building for operation as a 
group home for mentally handicapped individuals. The city zon- 
ing ordinance required an application for a special permit to es- 
tablish a "hospital for the feebleminded."le6 The plaintiff ap- 
plied for a special permit, was denied and argued that the denial 
violated equal protection and due process guarantees because 
similar uses did not require a special permit. 
The Supreme Court found that mental retardation was not 
a "quasi-suspect classification" and refused to apply heightened 
192. Id.  
193. Id.  
194. 473 U.S. 432 (1985). Cleburne is a seminal federal case arising out of a zoning 
dispute in Texas. 
195. Id. at 435. Under the rational relationship standard, the most relaxed standard 
of judicial review, the courts will uphold the land use scheme if there exists any rational 
basis for its imposition upon the subject property. The rational relationship test is the 
most common standard applied by the courts; because of the presumption of validity 
given to regulations, it is infrequent that regulations are set aside when this standard is 
used. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1262 (6th ed. 1990). 
196. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 436-37. 
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scrutiny to review the regulation.la7 Instead, the Court stated 
that "legislation that distinguishes between the mentally re- 
tarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate gov- 
ernmental purpose."1ae Using this standard, the Court found 
that the special permit requirement violated equal protection 
because other similar uses did not require such a special use per- 
mit. Based on the proofs submitted, the Court found that there 
was no rational basis for believing that the use would "pose any 
special threat to the city's legitimate interests."laa Again, the 
failure to tie these matters to the objectives of a comprehensive 
plan, and to show how they furthered such objectives, was fatal 
to the regulation. 
E. Ultra Vires 
Finally, Udell demonstrated that the enactment of a land 
use regulation must be within the powers that have been dele- 
gated to the regulator through an enabling statute.200 In Mori- 
arty u. Planning Board,201 the power of a planning board to re- 
view a site plan was strictly construed, so as to deny the board 
powers that were expressly granted to the building inspector. 
In Moriarty, the plaintiff proposed to build a metal 
fabricating plant on a vacant parcel of industrially-zoned prop- 
e r t ~ . ~ O ~  The existing zoning ordinance required site plan ap- 
proval by the village planning board before any building permit 
could be issued. After submitting an application, the site plan 
approval was denied because of inadequate fire protection mech- 
anisms. The question on appeal was not the "reasonableness" of 
the planning board's actions, but whether the planning board 
was empowered to deny site plan approval because of fire pro- 
tection concerns.203 
The court, strictly interpreting the scope of delegated pow- 
e r ~ , ~ ~ ~  found that the Planning Board was not empowered to 
197. Id. at 442. 
198. Id. at 446. 
199. Id. at 448. 
200. Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 900-01, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893-94. 
201. 119 A.D.2d 188, 506 N.Y.S.2d 184 (2d Dep't 1986). 
202. Id. at 189, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 185. 
203. Id. at 189-90, 506 N.Y.S.2d at 185. 
204. The court held that: 
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deny the building permit because fire code requirements were 
not met. The court stated that "[zloning laws are . . . in deroga- 
tion of common-law property rights and thus are subject to the 
long-standing rule requiring their strict c o n s t r ~ c t i o n . " ~ ~ ~ e -  
cause the state legislature did not empower the board to assume 
the powers of local fire inspectors in denying building permits 
due to inadequate fire protection, the court annulled the board's 
denial of the appl i~at ion.~~" 
Similarly, in Udell, the failure of the regulation to conform 
to the comprehensive plan was sufficient to show that it was not 
within the scope of the municipality's delegated powers.207 The 
lessons taught by the courts in Udell and the cases cited above 
strongly suggest that failing to conform land regulations to com- 
prehensive planning enhances the success of all four lines of at- 
tack available to property owners. 
IV. The Planning Antidote to Legal Challenges of Land Use 
Regulations 
A. The Regulatory Takings Challenge: A Fifth Line of Attack 
One important claim not advanced by the plaintiff in Udell 
was that the rezoning of his property constituted a regulatory 
taking. Similar claims are litigated so vigorously today that the 
forces arrayed against land use regulations are classified as a 
"movement."208 Seeds of confusion in distinguishing a regulation 
a planning board may not vary zoning regulations at  all without explicitly being 
delegated such power, nor may it deny site plan approval on the ground that the 
proposed use is not permitted under the zoning ordinance because the power to 
interpret the zoning ordinance is vested in the building inspector and the Zoning 
Board of Appeals. 
Id. at  196-97, 506 N.Y.S.2d at  190 (citations omitted). 
205. Id. at  195, 506 N.Y.S.2d a t  188-89 (construing FGL & L Property Corp. v. City 
of Rye, 66 N.Y.2d 111, 485 N.E.2d 986, 495 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1985)). 
206. Id. at  199, 506 N.Y.S.2d at  191. 
207. See supra text accompanying notes 129-131. 
208. See Kirstin Downey, A Conservative Supreme Court Addresses Property 
Rights, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 1992, a t  H1 (referring to "an increasingly militant property 
rights movement"); Keith Schneider, Environmental Laws Face Stiff Test From Land- 
owners, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1992, a t  Al; see also, The Private Property Rights Act of 
1991, S.50, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This act is evidence of the rigorous efforts of 
property rights efforts in the legislative arena. If enacted, this bill would have required 
federal agencies to conduct a "Takings Impact Analysis," that is, to assess whether regu- 
lations that they adopt might result in a taking of private property, and to avoid such an 
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from a taking of property under the Fifth Amendment were first 
sown in 1922, when Justice Holmes stated "while property may 
be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will 
be recognized as a taking."209 For a half century thereafter the 
Court entertained no occasion to explain how to determine when 
a regulation could become a taking by going too far. Beginning 
in 1978210 and culminating in 1987 in a trilogy of cases,211 the 
Court struggled with this issue, piercing little of its enigmatic 
nature.212 Since the U.S. Supreme Court decided Euclid u. Am- 
bler in 1926, it has reviewed challenges to regulations that arbi- 
trate burdens and benefits among property owners giving great 
deference to the regulator, striking down regulations rarely and 
only when the challenger can prove conclusively that the regula- 
tion in question has "no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfarefl2l3 or that the regula- 
tion results in a denial of "all economically beneficial or produc- 
tive use of the land."214 
It  was in the context of a case challenging a rezoning of the 
plaintiff's property that the Supreme Court articulated the test 
by which regulations are judged to determine whether they are 
takings. In Agins u. City of T i b u r ~ n , ~ ~ ~  which involved a land- 
effect, where possible. See Exec. Order No. 12,630, 53 Fed. Reg. 8859 (19881, which ad- 
ministratively imposed the same required actions on federal agencies that the Act would 
have. 
209. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
210. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
211. Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); First English Evan- 
gelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); and Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). 
212. "Even the wisest lawyers would have to acknowledge great uncertainty about 
the scope of [the] Court's takings jurisprudence." Nollan, 483 U.S. at  866 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
213. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) ("If the valid- 
ity of the legislative classification for zoning purposes be fairly debatable, the legislative 
judgment must be allowed to control."); see supra note 30. Compare Gorieb v. Fox, 274 
U.S. 603, 608 (1927) ("[Clity councils . . . are better qualified than the courts [to make 
these determinations].") and Zahli v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927) 
("[Ilt is impossible for us to say that [this zoning decision] was clearly arbitrary and 
unreasonable."), where regulations were upheld using this approach, with Nectow v. City 
of Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (19281, where a challenger overcame this presumption of 
validity by proving affirmatively that the regulation bore no relation to advancing a pub- 
lic interest. 
214. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 112 S.Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992). 
215. 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
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owner's challenge to the city's zoning ordinance, the Court 
framed a two-pronged test, drawing from two of its earlier cases. 
Zoning "effects a taking if the ordinance (1) 'does not substan- 
tially advance a legitimate state interest' or (2) if it 'denies an 
owner economically viable use of his land.' "216 
The Supreme Court in Agins articulated a standard set of 
considerations for courts to use when they review takings chal- 
lenges in the context of a challenge to a local zoning provision: 
I. On its face, is the " 'justice and fairness' guaranteed by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments" respected by the 
regulation?217 
2. The principal indicator of fairness is "in essence, a deter- 
mination that the public at large, rather than a single owner, 
must bear the burden . . . . ,9218 
3. An additional indicator that fairness is effected is that 
the regulation involves reciprocal benefits to the landowner and 
the 
4. Since "no precise rule determines when property has been 
taken, the question necessarily requires a weighing of private 
and public interests,"220 particularly in close cases. 
5. The public "benefits must be considered along with any 
diminution in market value" of the affected property.221 
6. Determinations of the legislature regarding the first prong 
of the Agins test, the legitimacy of the public interest, will be 
"clothed with a strong presumption of con~titutionality."~~~ 
216. Id. at  260 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. at  188 and Penn Central, 438 U.S. a t  138 
n.36). Compare this standard to that used by the court in McMinn v. Oyster Bay, 66 
N.Y.2d 544, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1985). 
217. Id. a t  263 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at  124). 
218. Id. a t  260; Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2923 (1992) (Ste- 
vens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens characterized this notion as follows: "Perhaps the 
most familiar application of this principle of generality arises in zoning cases. A diminu- 
tion of value caused by a zoning regulation is far less likely to  constitute a taking if it is 
part of a general and comprehensive land use plan." Id. at  2923. 
219. Agins, 447 U.S. a t  262. 
220. Id. at  260-61 (citation omitted). 
221. Id. a t  262. 
222. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Town of East Hampton, 82 A.D.2d 551, 553, 442 
N.Y.S.2d 125, 127 (2d Dep't 1981) (citing Robert E. Kurzius, Inc. v. Village of Upper 
Brookville, 51 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 414 N.E.2d 680,682, 434 N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1980); Mar- 
cus Assoc. v. Town of Huntington, 45 N.Y.2d 501, 505, 382 N.E.2d 1323, 1324, 410 
N.Y.S.2d 546, 547 (1978); McGowan v. Cohalan, 41 N.Y.2d 434, 436, 361 N.E.2d 1025, 
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7. Implicit in the presumption of validity is that the chal- 
lenger of the regulation must bear the burden of proving its in- 
validity. This is particularly difficult, with respect to the first 
prong, due to the presumption. 
These rules, derived from seminal cases, demonstrate the 
operating method adopted by a court that perceives itself to be 
working within the "stable core" of regulatory takings law.223 
That operating method is deferential to a legislature that is pur- 
suing a comprehensive plan for the municipality, meting out 
burdens on landowners generally for the overall benefit of the 
community. The court's sense of justice is not offended by a se- 
vere and demonstrated diminution in value, or by the methods 
used or objectives pursued by the regulators. 
To the extent that the legislative body has tied a regulation 
to a clearly stated plan, one that spells out the public interest 
pursued, the regulation will have a better chance of surviving 
whatever level of scrutiny a court decides to apply. In fact, it can 
be argued that a court is likely to select the standard of review it 
will apply depending on its sense of the seriousness of the public 
purpose advanced by it. The plan, if drafted with integrity, and 
properly advanced by the regulation, can greatly influence such 
matters. 
The conclusions drawn from a close reading of Udell and 
this brief discussion of regulatory takings cases are sustained by 
a review of the decisions of the New York courts that routinely 
sustain zoning regulations that are clearly supported by sound 
planning rationale. Several of these cases, and the importance 
they place on conforming regulations to planning, are discussed 
1026, 393 N.Y.S.2d 376, 378 (1977); Dauerheim, Inc. v. Town Bd., 33 N.Y.2d 468, 473, 
310 N.E.2d 516,519,354 N.Y.S.2d 909,914 (1974)). In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926), the Court wrote: 
If these reasons . . . do not demonstrate the wisdom . . . of those restrictions. . ., at  
least the reasons are sufficiently cogent to preclude us from saying, as it must be 
said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions 
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals or general welfare. 
Id.; see also, Agins, 447 U.S. a t  261 ("[E]xercises of the city's police power to protect 
[its] residents . . . have long been recognized as legitimate.) (footnote omitted). 
223. See John Nolon, Footprints in the Shifting Sands of the Isle of Palms: A 
Practical Analysis of Regulatory Takings Cases, 8 J .  LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1, 25 (19921, 
citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 99 (Paul Gewirtz ed. & 
Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989). 
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B. Compliance With A Comprehensive Plan Validates Land 
Use Regulations 
Dur-Bar Realty Co. v. City of U t i ~ a ~ ~ "  illustrates how com- 
pliance with a comprehensive plan will save even the most bur- 
densome land regulations. In Dur-Bar, the plaintiff sought to in- 
validate portions of the city zoning ordinance that created a 
"Land Conservation D i s t r i ~ t . " ~ ~ ~  The subject parcel was located 
completely within the flood plain of a river classified as a "Land 
Conservation District" by the city zoning ordinance.227 The 
plaintiff made two applications for special permits, but both 
were denied because the location within the flood plain required 
large amounts of landfill.22a Subsequently, the plaintiff brought 
suit, claiming that the ordinance was not "in accord with a well 
considered plan" and beyond the power of the enabling 
legislation.228 
The pivotal issue for the appellate division was whether the 
denial of the special permit furthered the "well considered 
plan." The court found the city ordinance to be "comprehensive 
. . . containing detailed use provisions and a carefully drawn 
map" that demonstrated "orderly and painstaking fore- 
The ordinance also contained evidence that i t  was 
"based on the Master Plan for the City of U t i ~ a . " ~ ~ ~  The "Land 
224. For a review of regulatory takings cases and a discussion of the standards of 
review applied to various types of takings cases, see id. 
225. 57 A.D.2d 51, 394 N.Y.S.2d 913 (4th Dep't 1977). 
226. Id. a t  52, 394 N.Y.S.2d at  915. 
227. Id. Utica's ordinance created fourteen zoning districts. Id. The "Land Conser- 
vation District" permitted only limited special uses: (1) farm and other agricultural oper- 
ations; (2) parks, golf courses, athletic facilities; (3) essential services; (4) disposal facili- 
ties and landfill operations; and (5) marinas. Id. at  52-53, 394 N.Y.S.2d a t  915. 
228. Id. at  53, 394 N.Y.S.2d a t  915. This required a permit from the New York 
Department of Environmental Conservation, but this agency advised the planning board 
that the permit would never be issued due to the location of the parcels within the flood 
plain. Id. 
229. Id. at  53, 394 N.Y.S.2d at  915-16 (quoting N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW 8 20(25) (Mc- 
Kinney 1987)). 
230. Id., 394 N.Y.S.2d a t  916; see also N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20(25) (McKin- 
ney 1987) ("Such regulations . . . shall be made . . . in accord with a well considered 
plan . . . ."). 
231. Dur-Bar Realty Co., 57 A.D.2d at  53,394 N.Y.S.2d at  916 (citing Unca ZONING 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace L. Rev. 393 1993-1994 
394 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 13:351 
Conservation District" was created after carefully assessing the 
character of the land in light of protecting the public from 
hazards that would result fro~li "intensive development" of the 
area.232 The district presented a number of problems, such as 
drainage and topography, that could have jeopardized the health 
and safety of the community. In addition, adequate standards 
existed to guide the Board in issuing special permits.233 The 
court held that where adequate standards exist in issuing special 
permits for specific areas to further the comprehensive planning 
strategy of the community, the zoning ordinance will not be ul- 
tra ~ i r e s . ~ ~ ~  
In McBride v. Town of F o r e s t b ~ r g h , ~ ~ ~  the plaintiffs chal- 
lenged the constitutionality of a town zoning ordinance requiring 
one-acre lots for the development of mobile homes. The plain- 
tiffs submitted a preliminary plot plan to the town board and 
the planning board for the development of a mobile home 
park.236 When this plan was submitted, the planning board had 
no regulations governing the submission of such plans. Likewise, 
there were no effective zoning provisions regulating mobile home 
parks a t  that time, but only the recommendations of the plan- 
ning board for a minimum one-acre subdivision restriction.237 
ORDINANCE 98 1.300, 1.500-1.590 (1967)). 
232. Id. a t  54-55, 394 N.Y.S.2d a t  916. But see Marshall v. Village of Wappingers 
Falls, 28 A.D.2d 542, 542, 279 N.Y.S.2d 654, 655-56 (2d Dep't 1967) (holding that regu- 
lating development by special permit in a "Planned Residential District" is not "compre- 
hensive planning," but simply a procedure providing for decisions on a lot-by-lot basis). 
The court distinguished this case because the character of the district in Wappingers 
Falls was not so unusual in topography or location as to justify special use permits. Dur- 
Bar Realty Co., 57 A.D.2d a t  54, 394 N.Y.S.2d a t  916. The Wappingers Falls procedure 
was a substitute for "comprehensive planning," while the procedure used in Utica "was 
chosen in furtherance of comprehensive planning." Id. a t  55, 394 N.Y.S.2d at  916-17. 
233. Dur-Bar Realty Co., 57 A.D.2d a t  55-56,394 N.Y.S.2d a t  917. The proposed use 
was required to be: . 
'designed, located, and . . . be operated [so] that the public health, safety, welfare, 
and convenience will be protected'; that the use not substantially injure the value 
of the neighboring property; that it be compatible with adjoining development 
and the proposed character of the district; and that it conform to 'all applicable 
regulations governing the district where located.' 
Id. at  56, 394 N.Y.S.2d a t  917 (citing UTICA ZONING ORDINANCE $8 6.600, 9.500 (1967)). 
234. Id. at  54-55, 394 N.Y.S.2d at  916-17. 
235. 54 A.D.2d 396, 388 N.Y.S.2d 940 (3d Dep't 1976). 
236. Id. a t  397, 388 N.Y.S.2d a t  941-42. 
237. Id., 388 N.Y.S.2d a t  942. 
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After this application was rejected, a mobile home ordinance re- 
quiring minimum lots of one-acre was enacted. The plaintiffs 
brought this action to declare the ordinance ineffective because 
their application preceded the adoption of the plan.a38 The trial 
court upheld the ordinance as constitutional and not violative of 
the plaintiffs' due process rights.23B The plaintiffs maintained 
that the zoning ordinance was ultra vires as not in accord with a 
comprehensive plan and appealed the decision of the trial , 
The appellate division upheld the ordinance as enacted and 
held that it was not ultra vires.=" The court stated that "the 
requirements of the enabling statute are met if implicit in the 
ordinance there is the element of planning which is both rational 
and consistent with the basic land use policies of the commu- 
 nit^."^'^ The existence of planning prior to the adoption of the 
ordinance, the rustic nature of the community and other factors 
were sufficient to define the community's comprehensive plan.a43 
Thus, the ordinance was not ultra vires. 
The plaintiff in Daum v. MeadeZJ4 owned a residentially im- 
proved parcel adjacent to an area that the town rezoned as a 
"Planned Industrial Park."a46 Prior to the rezoning, the town 
board had commissioned a planning study as the basis for a pro- 
posed "master plan."a46 That study was not completed prior to 
the rezoning of the subject pr~perty.~" The plaintiff challenged 
238. Id. 
239. Id. a t  397-98, 388 N.Y.S.2d at  942. 
240. Id. The plaintiffs also contended that they would suffer undue economic injury 
if the ordinance was not invalidated, that the ordinance was unconstitutional as it ap- 
plied to them, and that the ordinance abrogated their vested rights in the property as 
zoned prior to the enactment. Id. at  398-99, 388 N.Y.S.2d at  942-43. 
241. Id. a t  398, 388 N.Y.S.2d a t  942. 
242. Id. (citing 1 ROBERT M. ANDERSON. EW YORK ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE, 
8 5.02 (2d ed. 1973)). 
243. Id. 
244. 65 Misc. 2d 572, 318 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1971). 
245. Id. a t  572-73, 318 N.Y.S.2d at  200. The property was the site of sand excava- 
tion mines; the county had condemned and acquired title to the most northerly 650 acres 
of defendant's property. Id. at  573, 318 N.Y.S.2d a t  201. Subsequently, the town sought 
to amend the building zone ordinance and map to create the new district and apply it to 
this newly acquired parcel. Id. a t  574-75, 318 N.Y.S.2d at  202. 
246. Id. at  575, 318 N.Y.S.2d at  203. 
247. Id. 
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this action as "not made in accord with a 'comprehensive 
plan."'248 The plaintiff argued that the term "comprehensive 
plan" as stated in section 263 of the Town Law- meant the 
"master plan" that was commissioned by the Town B ~ a r d . " ~  
The court disagreed with the plaintiffs interpretation of a 
"comprehensive plan;" it stated that a comprehensive plan "can 
be found by examining all the relevant evidence,"250 including 
especially "the [town's] zoning law itself and the zoning map."261 
The court affirmed that zoning should "not conflict with the 
fundamental land use policies and development plans of the 
community"252 that "may be garnered from any available source,. 
most especially the master plan of the community, if any has 
been adopted, the zoning law itself and the zoning map."263 
Since these sources identified the need to provide sites for in- 
dustrial growth, pointed to the increasing scarcity of land availa- 
ble for that purpose, and justified the development of the sub- 
ject parcel to help satisfy those needs, the court found that the 
parcel's rezoning was in accordance with comprehensive 
planning.254 
In Rodgers u. Village of T ~ r r y t o w n , ~ ~ ~  the plaintiff ques- 
tioned the validity of two amendments to the village's zoning 
ordinance that created a new district permitting multiple-family 
dwellings in single-family The first amendment cre- 
ated a new zoning district, yet the district's boundaries were "to 
be fixed by amendment of the official building zone map" when 
future applications for this district were reviewed and ap- 
proved.257 Standards specifying the size and physical layout of 
developments under this zoning were prescribed.258 The second 
248. Id. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. at  576, 318 N.Y.S.2d a t  203 (quoting Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 471, 235 
N.E.2d 897, 902, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888, 895 (1968)). 
251. Id. (quoting Udell, 21 N.Y.2d a t  472, 235 N.E.2d a t  902, 288 N.Y.S.2d a t  896). 
252. Id. 
253. Id., 318 N.Y.S.2d a t  203 (quoting Udell, 21 N.Y.2d a t  472, 235 N.E.2d a t  902, 
288 N.Y.S.2d a t  896). 
254. Id., 318 N.Y.S.2d a t  204. 
255. 302 N.Y. 115, 96 N.E.2d 731 (1951). 
256. Id. a t  120, 96 N.E.2d a t  732. 
257. Id. 
258. Id., 96 N.E.2d a t  732-33. For example, this amended ordinance designated 
maximum building height, setback requirements and ground area of the plots to be occu- 
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amendment was the village's response to an application for re- 
zoning by the plaintiffs neighbor. After "repeated modifications 
. . . to meet the suggestions of the village planning board," ap- 
proval was ultimately given.269 
The court of appeals stated that "[wlhile stability and regu- 
larity are undoubtedly essential to the operation of zoning plans, 
zoning is by no means static" when "[clhanged or changing con- 
ditions call for changed plans."260 The court stressed: "[a] deci- 
sion as to how a community shall be zoned or rezoned, as to how 
various properties shall be classified or reclassified, rests with 
the local legislative body; its judgment and determination will be 
conclusive, beyond interference from the courts, unless shown to 
be arbitrary. . . ."261 Therefore, "[ilf the validity of the legislative 
classification . . . be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment 
must be allowed to control."262 
I t  is upon this foundation that the court upheld the two 
zoning amendments because they accorded with sound zoning 
principles, complied with every requirement of law, and were ac- 
complished in a proper, careful and reasonable manner.26s The 
village board of trustees was entitled to find that creating the 
new districts for garden apartment developments would prevent 
young families from moving elsewhere, would attract business to 
the community, would lighten the tax-load on the small home- 
owner, and would develop otherwise unmarketable and decaying 
The court also found that any allegations of "spot-zoning" 
were "without substance."266 "Spot-zoning" is "defined as the 
process of singling out a small parcel of land for a use classifica- 
tion totally different from that of the surrounding area, for the 
pied by the buildings. Id. 
259. Id. ,  96 N.E.2d at  733. 
260. Id. at  121, 96 N.E.2d at  733. Private interests must bow to public concerns if 
contrary to such classification since "the power of a village to amend its basic zoning 
ordinance . . . to promote the general welfare cannot be questioned." Id. 
261. Id. 
262. Id. (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926)). 
263. Id. a t  122, 96 N.E.2d at 733. 
264. Id.  
265. Id .  at  123, 96 N.E.2d at  734; See Walus v. Millington, 49 Misc. 2d 104, 266 
N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. Oneida County 1966) (failure to show reasons for deviating from 
the plan constituted spot zoning). 
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benefit of the owner of such property and to the detriment of 
other owners."26e The court stated that an ordinance enacted in 
accordance with a comprehensive zoning plan is not "spot-zon- 
ing," even though it may single out one small plot,2e7 or create 
small areas or districts in the center of a large zone devoted to 
different uses.26s The relevant inquiry was not "whether the par- 
ticular zoning under attack consist[ed] of areas fixed within 
larger areas of different use, but whether it was accomplished for 
the benefit of individual owners rather than pursuant to a com- 
prehensive plan for the general welfare of the community."269 
The court upheld the validity of the two amendments because 
they were applied to the entire territory of the villageZ7O and 
they were "in accord with the comprehensive plan" for the 
community.271 
Randolph v. Town of B r o ~ k h a u e n ~ ~ ~  and Place v. Hack27s 
266. Rodgers, 302 N.Y. a t  123, 96 N.E.2d at  734. 
267. Id. at  124, 96 N.E.2d a t  735; see, e.g., Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 300 
N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1945). 
268. Rodgers, 302 N.Y. a t  124, 96 N.E.2d at  735; see, e.g., Nappi v. LaGuardia, 295 
N.Y. 652, 64 N.E.2d 716 (1945) (a business area was created within a residential zone). 
269. Rodgers, 302 N.Y. at  124, 96 N.E.2d at  735. 
270. Id. at  125, 96 N.E.2d a t  735-36. The ordinances provided the same rights and 
privileges to every owner of a t  least ten acres. Id. at  122-23, 96 N.E.2d at  736. 
271. Id. In the dissenting opinion, Judge Conway found the action of the board of 
trustees of the village beyond its power to act under the Village Law. First, the dissent 
argued that the "plain language" of section 176 of the Village Law made it essential that 
"physical boundaries" be established for the district. Id. a t  127, 96 N.E.2d at  737 (Con- 
way, J., dissenting). In essence, the reference to "districts" or "zones" in the ordinance 
was meaningless without the creation of specified boundaries. Id. Second, the dissent 
stressed that the action of the board could not be considered as "in accordance with a 
comprehensive plan." Id. a t  128, 96 N.E.2d a t  737 (quoting N.Y. VILLAGE LAW 8 177 
(McKinney 1940) (current version at  N.Y. VILLAGE LAW 3 7-704 (McKinney 1973 & 
Supp. 1993)). The lack of investigation by the village to determine areas suitable for 
. 
multiple-family dwellings, the absence of standards for the type of construction neces- 
sary and the obvious benefit to titleholders of ten acre parcels who may wish to avail 
themselves of the ordinance did not constitute "comprehensive planning" by the board. 
Id. at  128, 96 N.E.2d a t  737. This was "spot-zoning a t  the request of landed interests 
who. . . find favor with the board." Id. The "substance" of the two amendments allowed 
a non-conforming use in an established zone. This required a variance, which could not 
be determined by the Village Board of Trustees since variances were within the sole 
discretion of the Zoning Board of Appeals. Therefore, "the particular method adopted by 
the Board was [not] in conformity with the legislative requirements found in the Village 
Law, and [outside] proper zoning theory and practice." Id. a t  130, 96 N.E.2d at 738. 
272. 37 N.Y.2d 544, 337 N.E.2d 763, 375 N.Y.S.2d 315 (1975). 
273. 34 Misc. 2d 777,230 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Wayne Co. 1962); see also Daum v. 
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exemplify the importance of forethought in zoning actions. In 
Randolph, evidence of forethought helped support the reasona- 
bleness of a controversial rezoning of a mixed-use area.274 Simi- 
larly, in Place evidence of forethought supplemented other evi- 
dence to prove that there was a comprehensive planning 
rationale that justified the major rezoning.276 
In Randolph, the plaintiff challenged the rezoning of his 
neighbor's property from "single-family dwelling" to "multiple- 
family dwelling."27B The issue on appeal was whether the "zon- 
ing amendment was made 'in accordance with a comprehensive 
plan' as required by section 263 of the Town Law."277 The Court 
of Appeals repeated the rule that a " 'comprehensive plan' is to 
be found by examining all the relevant evidence."278 The court 
reviewed the existing pattern of zoning, as embodied in the zon- 
ing ordinance and the z,oning map. This evidence demonstrated 
that the pattern of zoning was intended to protect the single- 
family residential areas west of the subject parcel by a discrete 
barrier.279 The subject parcel was an "exception" because the 
pre-amended ordinance permitted the construction of single- 
family residences in this "intervening barrier."280 The Town 
Board found that the development permitted by the amended 
ordinance would represent an excellent transition between the 
highway and the residential area, in a manner consistent with 
past practices relative to adjacent areas.281 The court concluded 
that . . . " 'forethought [was] given to the community's land use 
problems" and that . . . an adequate 'showing [was made] that 
the change does not conflict with the community's basic scheme 
for land use.' "282 The court also held that "what is mandated is 
[the] comprehensiveness of planning, [not] special interest, irra- 
Mead, 65 Misc. 2d 572, 318 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Sup.  Ct. Nassau Co. 1971) (examining all 
relevant evidence and finding the  major rezoning supported b y  a valid planning 
objective). 
274. Randolph, 37 N.Y.2d at 546, 337 N.E.2d at 764, 375 N.Y.S.2d at 316-17. 
275. Place, 34 Misc. 2d at 783, 230 N.Y.S.2d at  589-90. 
276. Randolph, 37 N.Y.2d at 545, 337 N.E.2d at  763-64, 375 N.Y.S.2d at  316. 
277. Id. at 547, 337 N.E.2d at 764, 375 N.Y.S.2d at  317. 
278. Id. (citing Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at  471, 235 N.E.2d at  901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 895). 
279. Id., 337 N.E.2d at 764-65, 375 N.Y.S.2d at  317-18. 
280. Id. 
281. Id., 337 N.E.2d at 765, 375 N.Y.S.2d at  318. 
282. Id. (citing Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 470, 235 N.E.2d at  901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 894). 
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tional ad ho~e ry . "~~There fo re ,  "a sufficient degree of compre- 
hensiveness of planning . . . [was] demonstrated and [the] 
amendment [was] in conformity with such planning."284 
In Place u. Hack,286 the plaintiffs sought to invalidate a zon- 
ing amendment that created an industrial district adjacent to 
their properties.286 They alleged that the amended ordinance did 
not accord with the "comprehensive plan," and sought to enjoin 
such use of the property.287 The dispositive issue for the court 
was whether the zoning ordinance conformed to the "compre- 
hensive plan" for the community.288 The court stated that a 
"comprehensive plan": 
"[I]s not necessarily a 'master plan' such as might be drafted by a 
municipality before embarking on a program of capital improve- 
ments; . . . nor need it be a written plan . . . . The comprehensive 
plan in New York and most jurisdictions is neither a written doc- 
ument nor a 'plan' in the usual sense of the term, unless an un- 
derlying purpose to control land use for the benefit of the whole 
community may be regarded as 
C .  Land Use Regulations Must Be In Accordance With "Cur- 
rent Comprehensiveness of Planning" 
In Town of Bedford u. Village of Mount K i s ~ o , ~ ~ ~  Bedford 
challenged Mount Kisco's adoption of a resolution rezoning a 
7.68 acre parcel of the village from one-family residential hous- 
ing to six-story residential housing.2e1 The parcel in question was 
an isolated northern section of the village, bounded on three 
sides by B e d f ~ r d . ~ ~ ~  The village's rezoning exemplifies the exter- 
nal impacts that one municipality's land use actions can have on 
283. Id. (citing Town of Bedford v. Village of Mount Kisco, 33 N.Y.2d 178, 188, 306 
N.E.2d 155, 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129, 136 (1973)). 
284. Id. 
285. 34 Misc. 2d 777, 230 N.Y.S.2d 583 (Sup. Ct. Wayne County 1962). 
286. Id. at  778, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 584-85. 
287. Id., 230 N.Y.S.2d at  585. 
288. Id. at  780, 230 N.Y.S.2d at 587. 
289. Id. a t  780, 230 N.Y.S.2d at  587 (quoting David A. Yaffee & Herbert N. Cohen, 
Notes, Spot Zoning and the Comprehensive Plan, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 303, 304, 305 
(1959) (citations omitted)) (footnotes omitted). 
290. 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973). 
291. Id. at  182, 306 N.E.2d at  156, 351 N.Y.S.2d at  130-31. 
292. Id. at  183, 306 N.E.2d at  157, 351 N.Y.S.2d at  132. 
Heinonline - -  13 Pace L. Rev. 400 1993-1994 
19931 LAND USE SYMPOSIUM 401 
another; it also illustrates how frustrating it is for impacted 
communities, like Bedford in this instance, as they struggle to 
exercise any influence over their neighbors' decisions. 
The Town of Bedford challenged this zoning change as "ar- 
bitrary and capricious," pointing out that it was inconsistent 
with a comprehensive plan adopted by Mount Kisco in 1958.293 
The matter had been disapproved by Mount Kisco's own plan- 
ning board and had been objected to by the Westchester County 
Planning Department, as well as neighboring  landowner^.^^' The 
issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, as a matter of 
law, the decision of the village board was "arbitrary and capri- 
~ i o u s . " ~ ~ ~  It found that although there had been no formal 
amendment to the comprehensive plan since 1958, there were a 
number of factors that justified the zoning amendment.2ee The 
zoning resolution itself included a finding that changes in the 
area since 1958 rendered the newly adopted use in conformity 
with that plan.297 
The court stated that "zoning changes must indeed be con- 
sonant with [the] total planning strategy, reflecting considera- 
tion of the needs of the community."298 Thus, "[wlhat is man- 
dated is that there be [current] comprehensiveness of planning, 
rather than special interest, irrational ad ho~e ry . "~~"  Most im- 
portantly, the court stressed that "[tlhe obligation is support of 
comprehensive planning, not slavish servitude to any particular 
comprehensive plan."300 Therefore, the proper standard is "cur- 
rent comprehensiveness of planning."301 Given this standard, it 
was not an arbitrary determination by the village board of trust- 
293. Id. at  182-83, 186, 306 N.E.2d a t  156, 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at  131, 135. 
294. Id. at  186, 306 N.E.2d a t  158, 351 N.Y.S.2d at  134. 
295. Id .  
296. Id. a t  189, 306 N.E.2d at  160, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136. The Village Board had 
clearly stated its findings in a formal resolution adopted by it. Id .  These findings con- 
tained the public interest justifications for its action. They included the need for revitali- 
zation of the affected area, the increased growth and population in the community, the 
need for housing to serve increased jobs in the area, and the lack of adverse effects upon 
the neighborhood. Id. at  187, 306 N.E.2d a t  159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at  135. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at  188, 306 N.E.2d at  159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at  136 (quoting Udell v. Haas, 21 
N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d 888 (1968)). 
299. Id .  
300. Id. 
301. Id. at  188, 306 N.E.2d at  160, 351 N.Y.S.2d a t  136. 
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ees to consider the welfare and economic stability of Mount 
Kisco as its first concern.302 
D. When a Court Finds Conformance with "Current Compre- 
hensiveness of PlanningJ' it Places a Heavy Burden of 
Proof on the Challenger 
A property owner in Huntington challenged a local zoning 
ordinance that restricted .development to single-family homes 
built on one-acre lots. The subject property in Tilles Investment 
Co. u. Town of Huntington303 was undeveloped farmland con- 
sisting of two contiguous lots totaling approximately fifty-two 
acres.304 This property was bounded on three sides by residential 
districts, with commercial and industrial zoning to the east and 
northeast. The plaintiff contended that the continued residential 
zoning of his property was invalid because it was "not in accord 
with a comprehensive plan."305 
The court of appeals rejected the argument because the 
plaintiff did "not demonstrate that the Town ha[d] so deviated 
302. Id. at  189, 306 N.E.2d at  160, 351 N.Y.S.2d at  136-37. Moreover, "there was 
nothing in the record [to] suggest . . . the action taken resulted from favoritism for the 
owners or any other extraneous influence." Id. a t  189,306 N.E.2d a t  160, 351 N.Y.S.2d a t  
137. 
Judge Breitel's dissent focused on the fact that "more than one municipality's plan 
was a t  stake," and that "the usual test of administrative action under the rubric of 'arbi- 
trary and capricious' [may not be] the proper standard." Id. at  189, 306 N.E.2d at  160, 
351 N.Y.S.2d a t  137 (Breitel, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, the scope of review 
should have been determined in light of procedural requirements for notice, hearing and 
standing, which considers the interests of conflicting localities and allows the court to 
override the delegated authority of the municipality to zone. Id. a t  190, 306 N.E.2d a t  
161, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 137-38. Judge Breitel stated: 
Section 452 of the Westchester .County Administrative Code, a primitive form of 
regional planning, confers on the courts a mandate to perform some sort of equita- 
ble adjustment. The section requires that notice and opportunity to be heard be 
accorded any adjoining municipality when a city, town or village proposes a zoning 
change for property lying within 500 feet of the boundary of the adjoining munici- 
pality. . . . In balancing the equities, flexibility and good judgment must be exer- 
cised. . . . [Tlhere is a strong presumption favoring the municipality's delegated 
authority to regulate land uses within its own territory. 
Id. Therefore, the effect of the zoning on the adjacent municipality could be severe 
enough to override the authority of Mount Kisco to  rezone the property. Id. at 191, 306 
N.E.2d at  162, 351 N.Y.S.2d a t  139. 
303. 74 N.Y.2d 885, 547 N.E.2d 90, 547 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1989). 
304. Id. at  887, 547 N.E.2d a t  90-91, 547 N.Y.S.2d a t  835-36. 
305. Id., 547 N.E.2d at  91, 547 N.Y.S.2d at  836. 
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from its original plan that a comprehensive plan [was] no longer 
in existence."30e The court found that although there had been 
numerous changes in the master plan affecting the area where 
the plaintiffs property was located, the development of sur- 
rounding areas reflected the town's original intention to keep the 
area re~idential.~~' "While the statutory requirement serves to 
protect individuals from arbitrary action on the part of local 
zoning authorities, it mandates 'comprehensiveness of planning 
[and not] slavish servitude to any particular comprehensive 
plan."'308 Therefore, the ordinance was upheld as "rationally 
serv[ing] the Town's continued interest in fostering residential 
devel~prnent . "~~~ 
V. Comprehensive Planning in the Year 2000 
The practical lesson learned from a review of these cases is 
straightforward: judges will seldom overturn land use regulations 
when it is obvious, in the structure of the regulatory program, 
that considerable and comprehensive planning is involved. In 
each of the decisions discussed in Part IV, the crafting of a regu- 
lation to meet a valid local planning objective saved the regula- 
tion from falling under a property owner's attack. 
The courts have impressed on local officials that they should 
take planning seriously as they consider and adopt land use reg- 
ulations. The cumulative effect of the case law provides a power- 
ful incentive for local governments to adopt land use plans, to 
keep them current and to see that local land use regulations ac- 
complish their objectives. However, this is a lesson better taught 
by the state legislature. Until the land use statutes are amended 
to accommodate this judicial comprehensive planning impera- 
tive, New York's municipalities are at risk of not knowing of its 
importance and having their land use regulations invalidated. 
There is a more crucial lesson that the case law teaches, 
however, one that must be learned before the land use system is 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
308. Id. (citing Udell, 21 N.Y.2d at 469, 235 N.E.2d at 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 893 and 
quoting Town of Bedford, 33 N.Y.2d at 188, 306 N.E.2d at 159, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 136) 
(citations omitted). 
309. Id. at 888, 547 N.E.2d at 91, 547 N.Y.S.2d at 836. 
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capable of handling the challenges of the twenty-first century. It  
is that "comprehensive" planning, in modern society, means 
planning that considers and is responsive to "regional" land use 
needs. When regulations only have local effects, it is enough that 
they conform with a land use plan that is "comprehensive" in 
that i t  considers and accommodates the local impacts of land 
development. However, as seen in the case of Town of Bedford 
u. Village of Mount Ki~co,~lO the impacts of local zoning and 
planning often are intermunicipal or regional in nature. The case 
demonstrates the inability of the Town of Bedford to influence a 
rezoning in the adjacent village of Mount K i s ~ o . ~ l l  The impact 
on the town was proximate and immediate. Long Island Pine 
Barrens Soc'y, Inc. u. Planning Board312 similarly demonstrates 
the inability of three adjacent towns to collaborate in measuring 
the impacts of their actions regarding over 200 development 
projects affecting the drinking water resource of nearly two and 
a half million people.313 The Berenson u. New Castle314 and 
Golden u. Planning Board316 cases demonstrate that regions ex- 
perience patterns of development that are greatly influenced by 
the land use decisions of constituent mun i~ ipa l i t i e s .~~~  The pol- 
lution of Long Island Sound and New York City's water system 
cannot be stopped without some method of coordinating the de- 
velopment decisions of the dozens of local jurisdictions in their 
Today, local land use decisions regularly have regional im- 
pacts. This was not the case when the land use system was cre- 
ated in the early years of the twentieth century, when communi- 
ties were separated geographically. Eighty years of urban sprawl, 
hastened by the automobile and expansive highway system,318 
have brought local jurisdictions and their residents into such 
close proximity that their actions greatly affect one another. Cit- 
310. 33 N.Y.2d 178, 306 N.E.2d 155, 351 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1973). 
311. See supra notes 290-302 and accompanying text. 
312. 80 N.Y.2d 500, 606 N.E.2d 1373, 591 N.Y.S.2d 982 (1992). 
313. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text. 
314. 38 N.Y.2d 102, 341 N.E.2d 236, 378 N.Y.S.2d 672 (1975). 
315. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972). 
316. See supra notes 57-62 and infra note 332 and accompanying text. 
317. See supra note 68. 
318. See Richmond, supra note 107, at 329-30. 
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izenship for most local residents is interjurisdictional as well: 
they live in one locality, work in another and shop and recreate 
in still others. Although the courts recognize these in- 
termunicipal connections and encourage local zoning to  accom- 
modate regional needs,31e there is no statutory requirement that 
local comprehensive plans consider regional interests. The New 
York legislature has not provided for a state-wide system of re- 
gional plans to which local plans could conform if their local 
drafters wished them to do 
Without some form of comprehensive planning a t  the re- 
gional level, the intermunicipal impacts of local land use deci- 
sions cannot be anticipated, measured and mitigated. These im- 
pacts have given birth to a dizzying array of federal and state 
statutes, the cumulative effect of which is to further erode local 
control over the land.321 Without regional planning, there is little 
opportunity to coordinate federal, state and local regulations 
and programs. This defect in the historic land use system frus- 
trates the goals of a large number of interest groups, not the 
least of which are local officials who desire to control their mu- 
nicipal destinies. Among those directly disadvantaged by the 
lack of regional planning are transportation and capital facility 
319. See supra notes 57-62 and text accompanying. 
320. See discussion infra, notes 340-44 and text accompanying. For examples of two 
distinct types of regional planning strategies that do exist in New York, see the 
Adirondack Park Agency Act, N.Y. EXEC. LAW $3 800-820 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 
1993) and the Hudson River Valley Greenway Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW $5 44- 
0101 to 44-0121 (McKinney Supp. 1993). 
321. A few examples, illustrative of this point follow: the Federal Water Pollution 
Prevention and Control (Clean Water) Act, 33 U.S.C. $3 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. I11 
1991) and the State Pollutant Discharge Elimination System, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW 
33 17-0801 to 17-0829 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993) together regulate the discharge of 
pollutants into both the surface waters and groundwaters of the state which subjects 
many development projects to state permitting authority; the National Estuary Program, 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. $ 1330 (1988), under which authority a moratorium on land 
development affecting Long Island Sound has been threatened; the Sole Source Aquifer 
Protection Act, N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, $9 55-0101 to 55-0117 (McKinney Supp. 
1993), under which litigation halted the development of over 200 projects including 
12,000 housing units; and the Wild, Scenic and Recreational Rivers System Act, N.Y. 
ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §$ 15-2701 to 15-2723 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1993), which lists 
development activities that are allowed and prohibited adjacent to wild, scenic and rec- 
reational areas in the state. For a complete discussion of these and numerous other fed- 
eral and state statutes that affect local control of land use see, John R. Nolon, The Ero- 
sion of Home Rule Through the Emergence of State-Interests in Land Use Control, 10 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 497 (1993). 
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planners, business and development interests, those in need of 
affordable housing, farmers, preservationists and environmental- 
ists. The stake of each of these groups in regional planning mer- 
its explanation. 
It is recognized that efficient transportation systems cannot 
be created without "comprehensive regional and local land use 
planning."s22 In New York, state transportation planners have 
suggested that this difficulty be remedied by the adoption of a 
comprehensive regional land use planning system.s2s For these 
planners, the principal benefit of regional comprehensive plan- 
ning is that it affords a workable basis for providing transporta- 
tion facilities at the same time that development occurs and 
when the demand for such facilities is created. If such a system 
of regional planning existed, the Department of Transportation, 
charged with transportation facility planning, could coordinate 
its efforts with those of local governments which have plenary 
land use decision making authority.s24 Among capital facility 
322. There will be no solution to transportation and related problems without 
better comprehensive regional and local land use planning. . . .Comprehensive, 
multi-modal and multi-disciplined planning can integrate transportation, air qual- 
ity, energy, economic, social, environmental and land use goals and objectives, 
maximizing and leveraging limited fiscal resources to meet Federal, State, regional 
and local needs. Comprehensive planning and growth management can provide a 
balance between land use development and the provision of adequate infrastruc- 
ture, while encouraging economic development and preserving and enhancing our 
man made and natural environment. 
NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF TRANSP., 21ST CENTURY MOBILITY. MOVING PEOPLE AND GOODS. 
THE TRANSPORTATION PLAN FOR THE HUDSON VALLEY, 262 (1992). This perspective is 
shared widely. See, e.g., LINKING TRANSPORTATION AND LAND USE PLANNING: A KEY TO 
SUBURBAN GROWTH MANAGEMENT, RESOURCE MANUAL, 1990191, referring to reports with 
similar conclusions prepared in Florida, Maryland, New Jersey, Oregon, and 
Washington. 
323. "In order to better integrate Land Use and Transportation the following rec- 
ommendations are made for implementation:. . . . Support Comprehensive Planning 
and Growth Management Legislation to introduce a statewide coordinated planning pro- 
cess for State, regional and local governments." NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF TRANSP., 
supra note 322, a t  262 (italics omitted). 
324. Under such legislation a State and Regional Planning process would be es- 
tablished consisting of a State Comprehensive Plan, State Agency Functional 
Plans, Regional and Local Comprehensive Plans. Each plan would be consistent 
with the State Comprehensive Plan. These coordinated planning products would 
guide the growth management process and provide the necessary linkage between 
land use and transportation goals. The growth management process would require 
localities to project their needs for roads, water, sewer and other facilities and 
ensure that the facilities are funded and constructed concurrently with the growth 
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planners of all types there is a deepening understanding that in- 
frastructure development cannot occur without benefit of the 
type of state-wide system recommended by the New York State 
Department of T r a n s p o r t a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  
Advocates of economic growth also call for regional land use 
planning as a means of avoiding economic stagnation and pro- 
moting economic competitiveness. Their reasoning relates 
closely to that of infrastructure providers who urge that land be 
developed concurrently with the provision of supportive capital 
facilities. Private market development is dependent not only on 
the requirements of local zoning, but also on the availability of 
supportive i n f r a s t r u c t ~ r e . ~ ~ ~  Business leaders recognize that 
fragmentation in land use planning results directly in the frag- 
mentation of economic development.327 Their recommendations 
parallel those of the State Department of Transportation in rec- 
ommending intermunicipal and regional land use planning.328 
The judiciary has called for the adoption of a system of re- 
gional planning to protect those in need of affordable housing, 
the lack of which has been labeled a "crisis" in New Y ~ r k . ~ ~ ~  In 
that they serve. 
Id. 
325. In calling for capital facilities to be provided a t  the same time that the develop- 
ment to be served by such facilities occurs, the New York State Department of Trans- 
portation is recommending a general approach to infrastructure planning recently 
adopted by the state legislature in Florida. The distinguishing ingredient of the Florida 
state-wide land use system is its "concurrency" requirement. "It is the intent of the Leg- 
islature that public facilities and sewices needed to support development shall be availa- 
ble concurrent with the impacts of such development." FLA. STAT. ANN. 3 163.3177(10)(h) 
(West 1990). See Robert M. Rhodes, Concurrency: Problems, Practicalities, and Pros- 
pects, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 241 (1990). Concurrency, under the Florida system, 
requires that local governments not issue development permits unless the impacts of 
development will not degrade public facilities and services below established levels of 
quality. JOHN M. DEGROVE, PLANNING AND GROWTH MANAGEMENT I  HE STATES 7 (1992). 
326. "Most private sector development would not occur without adequate infra- 
structure." BDO SEIDMAN, BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC VITALITY, WESTCHES- 
TER AT THE CROSSROADS 6 (1991) (an interdisciplinary study of economic stagnation in 
Westchester County, New York). 
327. "With such a fragmentation of planning and development controls, it is in- 
creasingly difficult to coordinate business development on a regional basis." Id. a t  24. 
328. "We believe Westchester is at  a crossroads imposing new leadership demands. 
We need to retain the businesses we have and attract new ones. We need to  have realis- 
tic government regulation and zoning and more county-wide planning." Id. a t  31. 
329. "Although we are aware of the traditional view that zoning acts only upon the 
property lying within the zoning board's territorial limits, it must be recognized that 
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1975, the Court of Appeals wrote: "[Iln enacting a zoning ordi- 
nance, consideration must be given to regional needs and re- 
quirements . . . . There must be a balancing of the local desire to 
maintain the status quo within the community and the greater 
public interest that  regional [housing] needs be met."330 New 
York's courts have recognized that regional land use guidelines 
are necessary to insure the provision of an adequate supply of 
affordable housing for the residents and workers within the 
region.331 
Similarly, the New York legislature recognizes that the 
state's natural environment requires land use regulations that 
transcend local political boundaries. For example, the legislature 
passed the Adirondack Park Agency Act which placed responsi- 
bility for land use planning and regulation over one-fifth of the 
state's land area in a regional agency, the Adirondack Park 
Agency.332 The legislature similarly effected local zoning author- 
ity by prescribing development activities that are allowed or 
prohibited adjacent to wild, scenic and recreational rivers, which 
flow through various political j u r i s d i c t i ~ n s . ~ ~ ~  Under Article 11 
of the Public Health Law, adopted by the state legislature, the 
State Department of Health in conjunction with New York 
City's Department of Environmental Protection, has the power 
to regulate land uses over a 2,000 square mile area in order to 
protect the quality of the city's drinking water system.334 Under 
zoning o f t en  has a substantial impact beyond the  boundaries o f  the  municipality." Ber- 
enson v. Town of New Castle, 38 N.Y.2d 102, 110, 341 N.E.2d 236, 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d 
672, 681 (1975). " T h e  people o f  New York State face a housing crisis." Governor's Hous- 
ing Task Force, Housing in New York,  Building for the  Future (1988). 
330. Berenson, 38 N.Y.2d a t  110, 341 N.E.2d at 242, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 681 (italics 
omitted). 
331. Zoning . . . is essentially a legislative act. Thus ,  i t  is quite anomalous that  a 
court should be  required t o  perform the tasks o f  a regional planner. T o  that  end, 
we look t o  the  Legislature t o  make appropriate changes in  order t o  foster the  de- 
velopment o f  programs designed t o  achieve sound regional planning . . . . Until t h e  
day comes when regional, rather than local, governmental units can make such 
determinations, the  courts mus t  assess the  reasonableness o f  what the  locality has 
done. 
Id. at 111, 341 N.E.2d at 243, 378 N.Y.S.2d at 682. 
332. N.Y. EXEC. LAW $ 3  800-820 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1993). 
333. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 15-2701 t o  15-2723 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 
1993). 
334. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §$ 1100-1108 (McKinney 1985); see also Mark A. Cher- 
tok and Michael D. Zarin, Land Use Conflict Between Ci ty  and Watershed Area Heats 
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state legislation, freshwater wetlands of over 12.4 acres in size 
may not be developed without a state agency permit, regardless 
of a local jurisdiction's approval of a development proposal.336 
These are but a few examples of a host of recent legislative en- 
actments that preempt, shape or direct local land use authority 
in the interest of protecting natural resources of regional 
~ ign i f i cance .~~~  
The state's overarching interest in preserving farmland and 
the agricultural economy, an issue of critical importance to New 
York's rural regions, led in 1971 to the enactment of legislation 
providing for state agency oversight of local land use regulations. 
Municipalities in certain areas are prohibited from unreasonably 
restricting or regulating farm structures or farming practices un- 
less they have a direct relationship to public health or safety.337 
More recently, the state legislature found that "agricultural 
lands are irreplaceable state assets" and that "[elxternal pres- 
sures on farm stability such as population growth in non-metro- 
politan areas and public infrastructure development pose a sig- 
nificant threat to farm operations. . . . "338 Under this 
legislation, regional bodies are given the authority to develop 
plans for the protection of the state's agricultural lands.33e 
Finally, New York's strong tradition of local control of land 
use has failed to give effective control over the impacts of land 
development to localities themselves. No rural municipality is 
capable of adopting land use policies that will save the rural 
agrarian land base; this it must do together with other munici- 
palities for the problem of agricultural land disappearance to be 
solved. Similarly, wild and scenic rivers, wetlands, and air and 
water quality cannot be protected by the land use policies of in- 
dividual communities. This they must do in concert with the 
other municipalities in the relevant ecological system. A climate 
Up, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 1993, at S-1, S-10 (outlining scope of the watershed area and the 
power to regulate within it). 
335. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW §§ 24-0101 to 24-1305 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 
1993). 
336. For a complete discussion of these state statutes, see NOLON, supra note 321. 
337. N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW § 305(2) (McKinney 1991). 
338. Agricultural and Farmland Protection Programs, N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW 
3 321 (McKinney Supp. 1993). 
339. Id. 3 324 ("County agricultural and farmland protection boards may develop 
plans . . . ."). 
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conducive to economic development and an adequate supply of 
affordable housing cannot be created by an individual munici- 
pality, since these are the products of regional market forces 
that can only be affected by regional strategies. 
Practically, then, local governments have been stripped of 
their ability to control the critical impacts of land development 
and to implement important land related policies. Legally, the 
recent responses of the legislature and courts to regional 
problems, such as the crisis in affordable housing and serious 
threats to critical natural resources, have eroded significantly 
the authority of local governments to control the use of. the land. 
How can these diverse and often conflicting interests be in- 
tegrated and accommodated in the land use system? Together, 
they constitute an interrelated series of interests that must be 
addressed as a whole. Housing and job development must be 
balanced. Private development of all kinds must be coordinated 
with the provision of supportive infrastructure by the public sec- 
tor. The pace and location of development must be carefully 
measured to prevent the disappearance of farmland and ,control , 
its impacts on the environment, so that natural resources such 
as endangered species, water bodies and public drinking water 
systems are not threatened. 
In the New York land use system, there is no provision for 
the accommodation of these diverse interests. The ongoing con- 
versation about comprehensive planning, envisioned by the 
framers of the historic land use system,340 has been silenced. 
This is so because it must take place today intermunicipally and 
among the many interest groups that are affected by the out- 
comes of land use decisions. In several other states, recent land 
law reforms have restored to local governments the ability to 
control these critical land use matters and enabled the discus- 
sion about land use decisions to continue among those affected 
by them.341 Such initiatives, often called growth management 
statutes, generally ensure that state and local land use regula- 
340. See-supra notes 52-53 and text accompanying. 
341. See Symposium, Growth Management and the Environment in the 1990s, 24 
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 905 (1991). The following states have adopted growth management 
statutes: Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, New Jersey, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
and Washington. 
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tions are tied to regional comprehensive knd  use plans. These 
emerging strategies consider, arbitrate, and represent a wide va- 
riety of interests including economic and residential develop- 
ment, infrastructure provision, the preservation of open space 
and agricultural lands, and the protection of the environment, 
among others.342 
At a gathering at Cornell University, a prestigious group of 
New York land use planners endorsed the general pattern of re- 
form in these other jurisdictions and recommended its consider- 
ation by the legislature and governor.343 The assembly's consen- 
sus statement contained the following observations and 
recommendations that clearly mark the path for land use reform 
in New York: 
There must be a concise statement of land use planning goals 
adopted by the Governor and the legislature. 
Planning must include both vertical and horizontal consis- 
tency; all decisions which affect land use, a t  all levels of gov- 
ernment, must be consistent with the state's overall goals and 
policies. 
The state must assist in the implementation of locally devel- 
oped and regionally coordinated land use solutions. 
County planning agencies should coordinate state and local 
planning. 
The state must clearly define cogent regions for the purposes 
of need identification, planning and coordination. 
The state should provide financial incentives for the develop- 
ment and implementation of plans that are coordinated in 
342. Most of the statewide planning statutes require that the following elements be 
included in local and regional comprehensive plans: transportation, economic develop- 
ment, affordable housing, environmental and natural resource preservation and agricul- 
ture. See Patricia Salkin, The Path Toward Reform? Growth Management Statutes in 
Other States, Coursebook for a Conference on New York Land Use Law Reform, Chap- 
ter 10, Chart J and Table 1, April, 1993. 
343. A position statement on these issues was drafted to reflect the consensus of the 
participants in the 1990 Spring Conference on the State of Planning in New York spon- 
sored by the New York State Association of County Planners, the Cornell University 
Department of City and Regional Planning, in collaboration with the Regional Plan As- 
sociation, the Upstate and Metropolitan New York Chapters of the American Planning 
Association, the New York Planning Federation, and the Upstate New York Chapter of 
the American Society of Landscape Architects. The quoted statement was adopted by 
the participants in Ithaca, New York on June 16, 1990. 
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this fashion.344 
Shortly after this statement was adopted by representatives 
of New York's principal planning organizations, the state legisla- 
ture adopted a regional planning strategy for the Hudson River 
Valley that partly responds to the statement's recommendations. 
In 1991, the Hudson River Valley Greenway Act was adopted 
designating ten counties that adjoin the Hudson River, from 
Westchester to Albany counties, as a planning region.346 Munici- 
palities in the Greenway region are encouraged by the Act to 
update their local land use plans and to engage with their neigh- 
boring communities in voluntary regional land use planning.348 
The legislation provides for the formation of a regional agency 
to assist them, technically and financially, with the preparation 
of these plans.347 
Among the incentives to localities to participate in regional 
planning under the Act is that state agencies must conform their 
actions in the region to the provisions of the regional plan. Once 
a regional plan is adopted under this statute, for example, the 
State Department of Transportation will be able to ensure that 
its transportation facility development accomplishes the objec- 
tives of the aggregated local plans. In this way, the Department 
of Transportation is enabled to plan in conjunction with those 
who possess land use authority, as it has expressed a critical 
need to do.348 AS important, in this one region of the state, the 
Act makes it possible for municipalities to reclaim effective local 
control over land use within the context of a regional planning 
strategy. 
VI. Conclusion 
The Hudson Valley Greenway Act is an encouraging sign 
that the New York legislature is awakening to the land use 
needs of the twenty-first century. Despite this beginning, the 
legislature has yet to consider adopting a state-wide system of 
344. 1990 Spring Conference on the State of Planning in New York, Consensus Posi- 
tion on State Planning (June 19, 1990) (on file with the Pace Law Review). 
345. N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW, 3 44-0109 (McKinney Supp. 1993). 
346. Id. 3 44-0119(3). 
347. Id.  3 44-0119(1). 
348. See supra note 322. 
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regional planning guided by a clear statement of the state's in- 
terest in responsible land use planning. This is so despite the 
criticism of the state's court and mounting evidence of discon- 
tent among economic interests, developers, housing advocates, 
farmers, environmentalists, and local officials regarding the 
weaknesses of the land use system.34B This emerging consensus 
that the land use system must be reformed represents an oppor- 
tunity for the state legislature to study the progress other states 
have made and to respond to the problems identified by the 
courts over twenty years ago.960 
The framers of the historical land use system reasoned that 
land use regulations should be "in accordance with" comprehen- 
sive land planning.351 In their day, local zoning was the preemi- 
nent technique for regulating land use and for shaping regional 
development patterns.362 Federal, state and regional regulations 
were not a significant factor in land development at that time. 
Cities and villages were largely distinct and geographically sepa- 
rate centers of population. 
Although the framers of this system were less than clear as 
to how tightly and explicitly land regulations were to be bound 
to comprehensive planning, the idea was clear: planning, of a 
scope and level of detail needed to inform and insure the reason- 
ableness of regulations, was required as a precondition of land 
use regulation. For this clear vision to be realized today, local 
comprehensive plans must be adopted, and they must be respon- 
sive to regional needs. 
How are local plans to accommodate regional needs when 
the state itself has not defined regions for planning purposes, 
has not collected and disseminated relevant regional data, nor 
properly identified truly regional needs? How is the state to 
move toward regional planning when, a t  the state level, there is 
no definition of the state-wide interests in sound regional land 
use policies? 
The trend toward systematic regional planning is responsive 
349. See Alistair M. Hanna, New York Land Use Opinion Survey, 13 PACE L. REV. 
415, 421-25 (1993). 
350. See supra notes 57-62. 
351. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. 
352. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
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to these problems. I t  must be studied and evaluated. The strate- 
gies emerging in other states offer a blueprint for reform, a 
method of balancing environmental protection and development 
rights, returning effective control of land use to local govern- 
ments, harmonizing local and state interests, and coordinating 
the use of limited public resources with a uniform vision of land 
development. 
The state's highest court has called for "[sltate-wide or re- 
gional control of planning."363 The stakeholders in New York's 
land use system are increasingly critical of it.364 Other legisla- 
tures have adopted reforms responsive to similar sentiments in 
their states. It is time for the New York state legislature to re- 
spond to the opportunity to enable New York's land use regula- 
tors to develop and implement a vision of how and where to 
grow. 
353. See supra note 58. 
354. See supra note 349. 
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